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The "Reasonable Investor" of Federal Securities Law:
Insights from Tort Law's "Reasonable Person"
& Suggested Reforms
Amanda M. Rose*
Federalsecurities law defines the materiality ofcorporatedisclosures by reference to
the views of a hypothetical "reasonableinvestor. " For decades the reasonable investor
standardhas been aflashpointfor debate-with critics complaining of the uncertainty it
generates and defenders warning of the under-inclusiveness of bright-line alternatives.
This Article attempts to shed fresh light on the issue by considering how the reasonable
investor differs from its common law antecedent, the reasonableperson of tort law. The
differences identified suggest that the reasonableinvestor standardis more costly than tort,
law's reasonableperson standard-theuncertainty it generates is both greaterand more
pernicious. But the analysis also reveals promising ways to mitigate these costs while
retainingthe benefits of theflexible standard
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I. INTRODUCTION

Securities class actions have been called the "800-pound gorilla that dominates and
overshadows other forms of class actions" in the United States and for good reason.I They
constitute nearly half of all class actions filed in the federal courts, 2 claim a
disproportionate amount ofjudicial time and attention due to their procedural complexity, 3
and are resyonsible for the "vast majority of the money involved in class action
settlements' -averaging over $5 billion annually for the past ten years, based on data
compiled by Cornerstone Research.5
To say securities class actions have been controversial is an understatement. For
decades public companies have argued that the enormous damage awards they threaten
renders settlement of even low-merit cases rational, promoting the filing of frivolous suits. 6
This argument convinced Congress to enact, over the veto of President Clinton, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 7 The PSLRA includes a variety of
measures designed to deter the filing of weak cases. Most importantly, the PSLRA
heightened the standard for pleading scienter in securities fraud cases brought under SEC
Rule 1Ob-5, while simultaneously denying plaintiffs the right to discovery until after
resolution of a motion to dismiss.9 The PSLRA did not, however, heighten the pleading
requirement for materiality, a notoriously vague element of plaintiffs' prima facie case
under not only Rule 1Ob-5,' 0 but also Section II of the Securities Act of 1933,1 and which
serves to define the scope of public companies' disclosure obligations more generally. 12
Today, materiality is the main fodder for merit-based critiques of securities class actions.
Materiality's vagueness stems from its definition: material information is information

1. John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1540.
4. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 825 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
5. See Laarni T. Bulan et al., Securities Class Action Settlements: 2015 Review and Analysis,
CORNERSTONE REs. 3 (2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2015/Settlements-Through12-2015-Reviewpdf.
6. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465, 1469,
1477-98 (2004) (outlining this argument and surveying empirical studies speaking to its validity).
7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub, L. No. 104-67 (1995), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
8. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming SecuritiesLitigationReform: Restructuringthe RelationshipBetween
Public and PrivateEnfbrcement ofRule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1319 (2008) [hereinafter Reforming
SecuritiesLitigationReform] (summarizing measures to deter the filing of weak cases).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(2), (b)(3)(B) (2012).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2017) (rendering it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a materialfact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading," "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security")
(emphasis added).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2017) (creating a private cause of action against specified defendants for any "untrue
statement of a material fact" contained in a registration statement, or "[omission of] a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading") (emphasis added).
12. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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that a "reasonable investor" would consider important. 13 The "reasonable investor" is at
best a shadowy figure, described only generically in judicial opinions and-in doctrine if
not in practice-someone for the fact-finder to identify case-by-case.1 4 Public companies
have long bemoaned the reasonable investor test, arguing that materiality should be judged
instead by reference to quantitative or other bright-line measures, so as to simplify
companies' disclosure choices and provide a basis for dismissal of securities litigation at
the pleadings or summary judgment phase.' 5
Neither the SEC nor the Supreme Court has been receptive to companies' pleas. To
the contrary, in 1999 the SEC released a Staff Accounting Bulletin flatly rejecting their
preferred quantitative approach to materiality. 16 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected other bright-line tests advocated by defendants, fearing such tests would create a
roadmap for fraud.17 Far from jettisoning it altogether, as companies would prefer, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the reasonable investor's role in securities litigation,
holding in OmnicareInc. v. Laborers DistrictCouncil ConstructionIndustryPension Fund
that whether an omission of a material fact renders a statement made misleading must, like
the materiality determination itself, bejudged from the reasonable investor's perspective.' 8
The lower courts have proven more sympathetic to company concerns, adopting a
variety of "immaterial as a matter of law" doctrines that allow for pretrial dismissal of
securities class actions. 19 These doctrines have been berated by scholars and plaintiffs'
lawyers alike. Not only do they permit decisions based on little more than judicial hunches
about "reasonable investor" behavior, the argument goes, but they also conflict with
Supreme Court precedent teaching that materiality determinations are highly fact-intensive
and thus should rarely be made before trial.2 0
The persistent disagreement surrounding the reasonable investor test is hardly
surprising. The dispute has always been framed in terms of the perennial "rules versus
standards" debate-with critics of the reasonable investor test complaining of the
uncertainty the test generates and defenders warning of the under-inclusiveness of the
bright-line rules offered as alternatives. Such debates tend to prove intractable: an
accounting of the tradeoffs occasioned by the choice between rules and standards rarely
reveals a clear victor.21
This Article approaches the issue in a different way. The point of departure is the
observation that the "reasonable investor" is not without kin in the law. To the contrary,
the reasonable investor has a well-known legal antecedent: tort law's storied "reasonable
person." The reasonable investor standard shares the same basic justification as tort law's
reasonable person standard: whether information is important or misleading requires an
objective but at the same time highly contextualized analysis, making it difficult to craft ex

13. TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
14. See infla Part filA.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 12, 1999),
https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm [hereinafter SAB 991.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1322 (2015).
19. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
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ante rules on point that are not grossly over- or under-inclusive. Since the earliest uses of
the reasonable person standard, defendants have complained about the uncertainty that
surrounds its application, and the room this leaves for inconsistent and even biased
decision-making. But the perseverance of tort law's reasonable person standard over the
course of centuries of common law development suggests that its benefits likely outweigh
its costs. This raises the question: does the reasonable investor standard differ from tort
law's reasonable person standard in ways that suggest it is less efficient?
The question is a natural one to ask. In interpreting the liability provisions of the
federal securities laws, the Supreme Court regularly seeks to bolster its decisions by
drawing analogies or distinctions between modem securities litigation and the common
law tort of misrepresentation.22 Scholars, too, have long engaged in such analysis.23 Yet
the relationship between the reasonable investor standard and tort law's reasonable person
standard remains unexplored.
A comparison of the two standards reveals at least three notable differences. The first
concerns the need for expert testimony in a securities case and the concomitant decreased
importance of the jury. In a simple tort case the indeterminacy of the reasonable person
standard is mitigated by the use of the jury, which can channel its collective wisdom as to
what constitutes reasonable behavior in deciding the outcome of the case. 24 Indeed, the
jury is viewed as uniquely competent to perform this task; assigning such work to a single
judge would present legitimacy problems thatjury resolution avoids. When a case involves
a specialized activity like securities investing, by contrast, a layjury is unlikely to have any
collective wisdom to offer; rather, expert testimony should be utilized to educate the factfinder. Judges are arguably better positioned than juries to evaluate expert evidence, or at
least as well positioned.2 5
The second important difference flows from the first: whereas it is tolerable and even
desirable to leave the identity of the "reasonable person" vague in a simple tort case,
because the jury can be trusted to imbue the concept with an accepted social meaning, the
same cannot be said about the identity of the "reasonable investor." Whether, for example,
the reasonable investor is a retail investor or a market professional is not a choice that
should be made byjuries on a case-by-case basis. Nor, for that matter, should they be made
by unaccountable judges. Rather, the identity of the reasonable investor is a policy choice
that should be made by the SEC in rulemaking or by Congress in legislation, so that
companies understand how to think about their disclosure obligations and experts in

&

22. See, e.g., Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1330-31; id. at 1334-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 171-73 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dura Pharms.,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343-45 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-45 (1988); Herman
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89,(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-49 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketActions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829
(2006); Margarget V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrinesto Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffsbe
Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96 (1985); Robert B. Thompson, The Measure ofRecovery Under Rule
10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages,37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984); Douglas M. Branson, Statutory
Securities Fraudin the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes ofFlexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 50 (1977).
24. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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securities cases understand just what it is they should opine on.
Tort cases alleging professional negligence provide a good analogue. The common
law does not ask juries in such cases to provide normative content to the standard of care,
and to apply that standard based on social intuition. The reason is obvious: a lay jury would
be wholly unsuited to those tasks. Instead, the standard of care is defined by law as the care
that would be taken by a reasonable professional in the same field as the defendant, and
the jury is required to apply that standard based solely on the expert testimony received. 26
The reasonable investor standard differs from the reasonable person standard in
another important way. Federal securities law doctrines, foreign to the common law tort of
misrepresentation, have expanded the universe of investors who can sue and have
facilitated the aggregation of their claims.27 As a result, the stakes in federal securities
fraud cases are dramatically higher than at common law. The uncertainty generated by the
reasonable investor standard therefore creates a stronger pressure to settle cases that are
not dismissed pretrial than does the uncertainty generated by the reasonable person
standard in traditional tort cases. It also creates a stronger pressure for potential defendants
to distort their behavior in socially undesirable ways in order to avoid litigation. In the
securities context, such distortion manifests when companies fail to disclose information
that may be helpful to investors, out of a fear it will be deemed misleading, or burden'
investors with trivial information, out of a fear that its omission will give rise to liability.
The distinctions identified indicate that use of the reasonable investor standard is, in
all likelihood, more costly than the prototypical use of the reasonable person standard in
tort. They do not, however, support abandoning the reasonable investor standard in favor
of bright-line rules, as critics have long advocated. Such a move would create loop-holes
that could be exploited to defraud investors, and the net effects of this tradeoff are
impossible to measure or predict. The distinctions do, however, suggest a package of
reforms capable of producing more certain social welfare gains.
The first reform that flows from the analysis has already been alluded to: the identity
of the reasonable investor should be elucidated through SEC rulemaking or federal
statute.28 Unlike in a simple tort case, there is no justification for leaving the standard of
care ambiguous when it comes to corporate disclosure obligations. Rather, as in
professional negligence cases, the standard should be defined by law. Specifying the
reasonable investor's identity may be politically uncomfortable for the responsible
policymakers, but it would not undermine the flexibility of the reasonable investor
standard: experts and fact-finders would still be called upon to consider all of the facts and
circumstances of a particular case in deciding how a reasonable investor would have
reacted to challenged information, they would just do so through a more carefully
articulated lens.
The second reform proposal is both bolder and more contestable. The analysis
suggests that a mechanism should be developed that would allow judges to apply the
reasonable investor test before trial, but with the benefit of evidence.29 Swayed by
companies' complaints about the intense pressure they face to settle, district courts today

26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 182.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
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often do apply the reasonable investor test to dismiss securities class actions pretrial. But
they do so using judge-made "immaterial as a matter of law" doctrines that are applied
without the benefit of expert testimony. Creating a procedural mechanism that allows
judges to consider such testimony in applying the reasonable investor test would result in
more principled decision-making.
To be sure, the effect of this approach would be to formally take the issue away from
the jury and place it in the hands of the judge, at least preliminarily. But unlike in a simple
tort case, there is no compelling policy reason for reserving this issue to the jury in the first
place. Moreover, the reality is that the jury will never decide the issue anyway: if the case
is not disposed of by the court pretrial, it almost inevitably will settle. 30 This, of course, is
the concern that has led district courts to adopt the "immaterial as a matter of law" doctrines
in the first place.
What form should the mechanism take? This Article argues that the most promising
approach would be for Congress to adopt a statute tying class certification of securities
claims to proof of a material misstatement, omission, or misleading half-truth. Granting
courts the authority to apply the reasonable investor standard at the class certification stage
would diffuse any unfair settlement pressure that the standard produces when left for
resolution at a class trial, and would foster the development of precedent-much the way
the "immaterial as a matter of law" doctrines do today. Unlike judges applying those
doctrines, however, judges applying the reasonable investor standard pursuant to the
proposed statute would do so lawfully, and with the benefit of critically needed expert
evidence.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the wellrecognized advantages and disadvantages of tort law's reasonable person standard. Part III
explains the role that the reasonable investor standard plays under the federal securities
laws and lays out the longstanding critiques leveled against the standard by both market
participants and securities law scholars. Part IV analyzes some of the ways in which the
reasonable investor standard differs from the reasonable person standard of the common
law. The reform implications of these differences are then addressed in Part V, and
potential objections and alternatives discussed. Part VI briefly concludes.
IL. THE REASONABLE PERSON

In a wide variety of settings, the law asks fact-finders to imagine the behavior of a
hypothetical reasonable person in order to determine whether a litigant's behavior
comported with a particular legal requirement.3 1 This practice is most famously associated
30. According to NERA, out of the nearly 5,000 securities class actions filed since the PSLRA was enacted
in 1995, only 21 (0.4%) have gone to trial and only 16 (0.3%) have been tried to completion. See Stefan Boettrich
& Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:2016Full-YearReview , NERA ECON.
CONSULTING 41 (2017), http://www.nera.com/content/dami/nera/publications/2017/PUB_2016_Securities-YearEndTrendsReport_0117.pdf; see also Securities Class Action Filings: 2017 Mid-Year Assessment,
CORNERSTONE RES. 20 (2017), https://www.comerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2017-Midyear-Assessment (reporting that of all securities class actions filed between 1997 and 2016, 10%
are ongoing, 42% have been dismissed pretrial, 48% have settled, and less than 1% have reached a trial verdict).
31. See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985) (observing
that American attorneys "cannot even begin to argue about most issues of responsibility and liability without first
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with the common law of tort. As every first-year law student leams, whether a defendant
has acted negligently depends on whether a reasonable person in like circumstances would
have taken more care.32 Whether a matter is material for purposes of the common law tort
of misrepresentation similarly depends on whether a reasonable person would have
attached importance to it in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
33
question.
Tort law's use of the reasonable person standard has well-recognized benefits.
Perhaps most famously, the court in Vaughan v. Menlove stressed the advantage of the
reasonable person standard over one that would ask whether a litigant "acted bona fide to
the best of his judgment." 34 The court explained: "Instead .. . of saying that liability []
should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable
as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which
requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe." 35
In addition to eliminating difficult proof problems that would attend a subjective
standard, thus aiding in administrability, the objective nature of the reasonable person
standard has other advantages. Most notably, it has been applauded as creating desirable
incentives, as the threat of liability may encourage individuals to push themselves to act as
a reasonable person would. This, in turn, may allow the public to "more accurately gauge
the level of self-protective care that they need to employ than would be possible if the
amount of care that could be expected from others varied with the characteristics of each
,36
individual."
Another benefit of the reasonable person standard is that it is, in fact, a
standard-not a rigid rule-and thus can be applied with sensitivity to the myriad facts and
circumstances which might influence the thoughts or behavior of a reasonable person in
different situations. 37
Of course, the ease with which the standard can be applied, and the strength of its
incentive effects, depends on how readily and consistently the fact-finder can channel the
reasonable person. If the reasonable person standard is content-less, decisions applying it

asking what a hypothetical reasonable person would do under the circumstances"); Mayo Moran, The Reasonable
Person: A Conceptual Biography in ComparativePerspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1233, 1234 (2010)
[hereinafter Moran, The Reasonable Person] (observing that the reasonable person has "played a critical role in
many different aspects of private law, criminal law, and recently has also extended his reach into the world of
public law").
32.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§3

cmt. a (2010).

33. The common law tort of misrepresentation treats materiality as a component of justifiable reliance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). For reliance to be justified, the matter misrepresented must be
material. A matter is considered material if either a reasonable man would attach importance to it or if the "maker
pf the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as
important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it." Idh
34. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493. The reasonable person standard incorporates
characteristics of the particular defendant in special cases, such as those involving children and the infirm. See
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 57-60 (3d ed. 2007).

35. Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at493.
36. ABRAHAM, supranote 34, at 56.
37. But see generallyChristopher Jackson, ReasonablePersons, ReasonableCircumstances, 50 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 651 (2013) (problematizing traditional selection of circumstances that are considered in applying the
reasonable person test).
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will be ad hoc and unprincipled, leaving us with something as variable as the subjective
standard rejected in Vaughan. In light of this, it is not surprising that considerable efforts
have been made to give flesh to the reasonable person. Perhaps most famously, Judge
Learned Hand's eponymous formula gives structure to the reasonable person's decisionmaking process: A reasonable person is one who would forego taking some precaution
only when the burden of that precaution (B) exceeds the harm that the precaution would
avoid (L) multiplied by its probability (P); thus, negligence should be found if a defendant
failed to take a precaution under circumstances where B < PL.38
The Hand Formula, which is reflected today in Section 3 of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS, 3 9 imbues the reasonable person with a particular (and contestable)
normative perspective: a reasonable person should make decisions according to a utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis with the ultimate goal of maximizing social welfare.40 Competing
normative visions of the reasonable person exist, including most prominently a Kantian
vision of the reasonable person premised on notions of equal freedom, 4 1 and alternatively,
a feminist vision premised on an ethic of care.42
While the relative strengths and limitations of these competing conceptions of the
reasonable person are immensely interesting as a philosophical matter, one's view on these
subjects is ultimately of little practical importance. This is so because jurors-who are
typically tasked with applying the reasonable person standard-are rarely given detailed
instructions on how they should go about doing so. 43 To the contrary, model jury
instructions tend to be quite generic. For example, California's instruction on the basic
standard of care in tort provides that a "person is negligent if he or she does something that
a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that
a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation"; as for what that means, the
instructions unhelpfully inform jurors: "You must decide how a reasonably careful person
44
would have acted in [name of plaintiff/defendant]'s situation."
And this, somewhat paradoxically, points to perhaps the strongest argument in favor
of the reasonable person standard. Rather than specifying a more precise notion of socially
appropriate behavior, which would be a politically difficult endeavor in a pluralistic society
such as the United States, 4 5 the reasonable person standard relies on the collective wisdom
of the jury as a proxy for the conscience of the community. As Prosser and Keeton explain

38. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
39. See supra note 32.
40. For a comprehensive overview of this perspective, see Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable
Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323, 328-48 (2012).
41. According to this perspective, "reasonable care ought to be the level of care that reconciles the
conflicting liberties of injurers and victims: freedom of action (freedom to act and thereby impose risks) on the
one hand, and security (freedom from accidental harm) on the other." Id. at 351. For a fulsome discussion of this
view and its variants, see id. at 348-61.
42. For an introduction to this approach, see id. at 361-70.
43. See id. at 334 n.52 and authorities cited therein.
44.

CIVIL

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS,

CACI

NO.

401

(JUDICIAL

COUNCIL

OF CALIFORNIA

2017),

http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/CAC_2017 Edition.pdf.
45. See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 981 (explaining that a "pluralistic legal order mandates discretion,"
something the standard of reasonableness affords because it "invites consideration of diverse normative criteria
in resolving the dispute").
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it, the reasonable person is "a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,
determined by the jury's social judgment."46 The important role that the jury plays in
justifying the reasonable person standard was recognized in Vaughan itself. The court in
that case dismissed the argument that the reasonable person standard was "too uncertain to
afford any criterion" by invoking its faith in the jury: "The care taken by a prudent man
has always been the rule laid down; and as to the supposed difficulty of applying it, a jury
has always been able to say, whether, taking that rule as their guide, there has been
negligence on the occasion in question." 47 If instead a judge applied the reasonable person
standard, he or she would be called upon to channel the "conscience of the community"
alone, and the decision reached would be far less legitimate than one reached through the
consensus of a group of diverse jurors.
This strength of the reasonable person standard is, however, subject to important
qualifications. Most notably, in certain types of cases lay juries are poorly equipped to
judge the reasonableness of conduct because they lack relevant personal experiences or
background social norms upon which to draw. This is true in cases involving specialized
activities, like the administration of medical care or other professional activities that require
advanced training. There simply is no developed "conscious of the community" writ large
to apply to the activities challenged in such cases. In this context, the common law replaces'
the reasonable person standard of a simple negligence case with a more precisely identified
standard of care-one keyed to the behavior of a reasonable professional in the same field
as the defendant-and instructs the jury to apply this standard based only on the expert
testimony received.48 The jury has no special advantage relative to the judge in evaluating
expert evidence; to the contrary, many would argue that judges on average are better
positioned to do so than lay jurors. 49
There are other bases for critiquing the reasonable person standard. The very
vagueness that allows the standard to serve as a conduit for community norms also allows
it to serve as a conduit for community prejudices. 50 This has led critical legal theorists to

46.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (W. PAGE KEETON ed,

5th ed. 1984); see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths andPowerless Men: The Ideology ofReasonableness
in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1192 (1990) ("Just as in negligence law, what constitutes
reasonable behavior [under Title VII] is recognized to be a political question of where to draw the line between
group and societal interests--that is, between diversity and conformity-and it is society, not the court, that makes
that judgment. Thus, it is not so much that the reasonableness test is itself a neutral standard, but rather that is
serves as a vehicle for importing an already-arrived-at (and legitimate) political solution into the law.").
47. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), 132 Eng. Rep 490, 493.
48. See, e.g., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CACINos. 501, 600.
49. See Douglas G. Smith, Historicaland Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
377, 381 & n.4 (1996) (noting that the "jury has been characterized as an inferior and inefficient" institution for
deciding complex issues, and collecting articles advancing this position). Indeed, the sentiment that judges are
better equipped to handle complex cases than lay juries has led U.S. courts to flirt with the notion ofa "complexity
exception" to the Seventh Amendment (see, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3rd
Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420
F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); but see In re U. S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979)), and has caused
the United Kingdom to abandon the civil jury almost entirely (see Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, The
Continuing Decline ofthe English Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000)).
50. See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 13 (2003) ("the reasonable person may act as an invitation to
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challenge the concept as fueling gender and racial biases. ' The vagueness of the standard
similarly presents problems when fact finders are asked to judge behavior which fails to
conjure a community consensus because it is novel, or because there are multiple legitimate
paradigms of such behavior. In such cases, even unbiased fact-finders will reach divergent
and unpredictable outcomes, undermining the incentive effects of the reasonable person
standard.52
Finally, to the extent that the Hand Formula does guide fact-finders' understanding of
the reasonable person standard, it invites not only the normative objections alluded to
above, but also raises empirical concerns. A substantial body of research on human
behavior suggests that individuals do not typically behave as the rational actor envisioned
by classical economists. 53 To the contrary, individuals suffer from a battery of cognitive
biases that, among other things, interfere with their ability to properly assess
probabilities. 54 This is clearly problematic if one believes that the reasonable person should
descriptively capture the "ordinary" person. It is less problematic if one views the
reasonable person as setting an aspirational standard of behavior, and the risk of legal
liability creates incentives for individuals to overcome their cognitive biases in order to
conform to it.
III. THE REASONABLE INVESTOR
For better or for worse, the federal securities laws place heavy reliance on a variant of
the reasonable person standard-the so-called "reasonable investor" standard. Most
importantly, the reasonable investor standard informs the concept of materiality, 55 which
in turn defines the scope of companies' disclosure obligations. For example, Regulations
S-K and S-X, which govern the narrative and financial content of registration statements
and periodic reports, limit many of their disclosure requirements to "material"

draw on underlying stereotypes that are often played out through unreflective ideas of what is normal or
ordinary").
51. See Moran, The Reasonable Person,supra note 31, at 1236 (explaining that "concerns about the nature
and use of the discretion implicit in the reasonable person test began to take on a sharper edge as feminists and
other equality seekers turned their attention to the way that reliance on the reasonable person tends to reinforce
the privilege of the powerful while simultaneously exacerbating the plight of those who are disadvantaged"); see
also id. at 1249-59 (explaining how gendered conceptions of the reasonable person may have led to biased
applications of the defenses of provocation and self-defense in criminal cases); Ehrenreich, supra note 46, at 1230
(arguing that "both reasonableness and pluralism are problematic concepts which hide the power struggles behind
legal issues and mystify the courts' role in resolving such struggles").
52. Moreover, in some situations we may prefer that the decision maker be explicit about the choices
driving the legal conclusion reached. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay
Personsin the Supreme Court's Miranda and FourthAmendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1481, 1536
(2010) ("By using the metaphor of the 'reasonable person' . . . the Court avoids a forthright assessment of the
factors it balances in deciding the constitutional limits on government investigative powers. Such an
approach . . . hampers the ability of citizens and their elected representatives to determine whether to buttress
those rights through legislation or state constitutions.").
53. For an introduction to this body of research, see generally Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man,
and the Futureof BehavioralLaw and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (2003).
54. See Miller & Perry, supra note 40, at 341-42 and authorities cited therein.
55. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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information. 56 Moreover, Rule 408, under the Securities Act of 1933, and Rule 12b-20,
under the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, require companies to disclose, in addition
to the information expressly required to be included in SEC filings, "such further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading." 57 The liability provisions
in the federal securities laws are similarly limited to misstatements of material fact, or the
omission of material facts necessary to render statements made not misleading.5 8 In
addition, Regulation FD prohibits companies from selectively disclosing material
corporate information to certain market participants, 59 and corporate insiders are forbidden
to trade in their companies' stock for personal benefit when in possession of material
nonpublic information. 60
The Supreme Court first adopted the reasonable investor test for materiality in TSC
Indus. v. Northway, a shareholder suit brought under SEC Rule 14a-9 alleging that the
defendant's proxy statement omitted material facts required to be stated therein.61 The
Court explained that the question of materiality
. . . is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or
misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor .

.

. . An omitted fact is material if

there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in deciding how to vote ... Put another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information made available. 62
Subsequently, in Basic v. Levinson, the Court "expressly adopt[ed] the TSC Industries
standard of materiality" as the general standard for materiality under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob5,63 and similar formulations have also been incorporated into SEC rules64 and accounting
56. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2017); 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(c)(2) (2005).
57. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408 ,240.12b-20 (2005) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., supra notes 10-11.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
60. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
61. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Before the Supreme Court weighed in on the meaning
of the materiality concept, "the SEC defined the term by focusing on 'those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed." James D. Redwood, QualitativeMateriality Under the SEC Proxy
Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passingin the Night?,
1992 Wisc. L. REv. 315, 332 (1992).
62. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445, 449. The TSC court departed somewhat from the conventional tort test of
materiality by requiring that there be a "substantial likelihood" a reasonable investor would consider the
information important. See supra note 33.

63. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
64. SEC Rule 405, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, provides that "the term material, when
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required
to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security registered." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2017). SEC Rule 12(b)(2),
promulgated under the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, similarly provides: "The term 'material,' when used
to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to
those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1994). See also Yvonne
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guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 65
In addition to defining the concept of materiality, the reasonable investor also plays a
role in defining the concept of "misleadingness" under the liability provisions of the federal
securities laws. Plaintiffs in securities class actions often claim that a challenged statement
was not, in and of itself, a misstatement, but rather was rendered misleading (and therefore
actionable) by the omission of other material information necessary to put the statement in
context-a so-called "half-truth" theory of liability.6 6 The recent Supreme Court case
OmnicareInc. v. LaborersDistrict Council ConstructionIndustry Pension Fund involved
such a theory.67 Plaintiffs challenged certain opinions expressed in the defendant's
registration statement related to its legal compliance.68 As is common in Section 11 cases,
the plaintiffs omitted any allegations of scienter so as to avoid heightened pleading under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 69 thus conceding that the opinions were genuinely
held. 70 In light of this, the Court held that the opinions themselves could not be deemed
misstatements of fact, even if objectively unreasonable, 7 1 but explained that they might
nevertheless be actionable if rendered misleading by the omission of other information.
The Court declared that "whether a statement is 'misleading' depends on the perspective
of a reasonable investor: The inquiry (like the one into materiality) is objective." 72 The
Court elaborated:
[A] reasonable investor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an
opinion statement to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the

Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality"Under US. FederalSecurities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 661, 662-63 (2004) (observing that the TSC standard "has been judicially applied to insider trading and
administratively applied to selective disclosure under Regulation FD").
65. See Statement of FinancialAccounting Concepts No. 2: Qualitative Characteristicsof Accounting
(1980),
FASB
Information,
www.fasb.org/cs/blobserver?bobcol=urldata&blobtable=mungoblobs&blobkey-id&blobwhere=l 17582090052
6&blobheader-application%2Fpdf (defining materiality). FASB recently proposed to amend the FASB
Accounting Standards Codification so that it identifies materiality as a legal concept. See ACS Notes to Financial
Statements, DELOITTE (Sept. 24 2015), http://www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/fasb/presentation/asc235
(explaining FASB Accounting Standards Codification Topic 235); ProposedAccounting StandardUpdate,FASB
2015),
24,
(Sept.
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/DocumentC/DocumentPagecid=l 176166402325&acceptedDisclaimertrue
[hereinafter Proposed ASU]. See also Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the
Enforcement ofthe FederalSecurities Laws, 62 Bus. LAW. 317, 320-21 (2007) ("The Commission has repeatedly
acknowledged the TSC Industries standard as controlling in the agency's regulatory initiatives and enforcement
actions. It also informs the professional standards applied to public company auditors.").
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others, 52
STAN. L. REV. 87, 90-91 (1999) [hereinafter Langevoort, Half-Truths].
67. Omnicare, Inc., v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1318 (2015).
68. Id. at 1323-24.
69. Scienter is not an element of a Section II claim. Therefore, the heightened pleading called for under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for allegations of fraud is triggered in a Section 11 case only if the plaintiffs
voluntarily plead facts that "sound in fraud." See Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section II
of the Securities Act: A Study in JudicialActivism, 63 RUTGERS U. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (2010).
70. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327.
71. Id. ("a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an 'untrue statement of material fact', regardless whether
an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong").
72. Id.
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opinion-or, otherwise put, about the speaker's basis for holding that view. And
if the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will
mislead its audience. .. . Thus, if a registration statement omits material facts
about the issuer's inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion,
and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the
statement itself, then § 1I's omissions clause creates liability.7 3
The question of what information a reasonable investor would understand a statement
to convey, like the question of what information a reasonable investor would consider
important, turns on two key factors: (1) just who the reasonable investor is and (2) the
factual context. Both factors are discussed below.
A. Who is the Reasonable Investor?
Notwithstanding the important role the reasonable investor plays in federal securities
regulation, "courts have not spoken with one clear voice on its identity," leaving the figure
"anonymous, elusive, and the subject of much inquiry." 74 The snippets ofjudicial guidance
on the reasonable investor's characteristics that do exist lead most scholars to envision a
rational actor, possessing a basic level of financial sophistication. 75 Case law instructs that
"the reasonable investor grasps market fundamentals-for example, the time value of
money, the peril of trusting assumptions, and the potential for unpredictable difficulties to
73. Id. at 1328-29.
74. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REv. 679, 694-95 (2013) [hereinafter Lin, The New
Investor]. See also Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U. PA.
J. Bus. & EMPL. L. 339, 344 (2008) [hereinafter Padfield, Is Puffery Material] ("There are differing notions as to
who exactly this reasonable investor is for purposes of materiality determinations under the securities laws. Some
argue that the reasonable investor for purposes of assessing materiality is 'a savvy person who grasps market
fundamentals.' . . .However, courts have not spoken in one voice on this point . . . ."); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Female Investors and Securities Fraud:Is the Reasonable Investor a Woman?, I5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.,
291, 293 (2009) ("The conception of the reasonable investor . . is at best fluid and at worst ill-defined. The
descriptive and normative attributes of the reasonable investor are critically important to the development of
securities fraud law and regulation, yet they are under-analyzed.").
75. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 466-67 (2015) (observing that
"[i]n the many decades since the birth of the modem financial regulatory framework, regulators, scholars, and
courts have not universally agreed upon the identity and defining characteristics of the reasonable investor," but
that the "leading paradigm" views the reasonable investor as "the idealized, perfectly rational actor of neoclassical
economics"); David A. Hoffman, The "Duty " To Be A Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 542 (2006)
[hereinafter Hoffman, "Duty" To BeA RationalShareholder]("This Article finds evidence that courts implicitly
equal investors' 'reasonableness' with economic rationality, and irrationality as unreasonableness."); Heminway,
supranote 74, at 297 ("Decisional law and the related literature support the view that the reasonable investor is a
rational investor (although judicial decisions are careful not to make this linkage explicit)."); Barbara Black,
BehavioralEconomics and Investor Protection:Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV.
1493, 1495 (2013) ("courts hold investors to a high standard of rationality"); Langevoort, Half-Truths,supra note
66 at 105 (noting that most courts "assume that the 'listener' with respect to corporate publicity is the
sophisticated, informed investor"); cf Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient CapitalMarket Model: A
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 385 (1984) (describing cases adopting an expansive
definition of the reasonable investor so as to protect unsophisticated as well as sophisticated investors); Stefan J.
Padfield, ImmaterialLies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
143, 155 (2010) [hereinafter Padfield, ImmaterialLies] ("It seems clear, as far as the SEC is concemed, that the
reasonable investor, for purposes of materiality determinations, is the unsophisticated retail investor").
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derail new products."76 In addition, the "Supreme Court tells us that courts should not
treat reasonable investors like 'nitwits' and ascribe to them 'child-like simplicity,"' and
"courts have stated disclosure should not be tailored to 'what is fit for rubes."' 77 Moreover,
certain materiality doctrines which have developed in the lower courts (discussed infra7 8
assume that reasonable investors: discount sales talk; if given certain pieces of information,
can and will perform mathematical calculations to determine the bottom line; and consider
the context surrounding a statement in determining its import. 79 Reasonable investors are
80
not, however, expected to possess skills rising to the level of a trained investment analyst.
This conception of the reasonable investor as a rational but nonprofessional
participant in the capital markets, though consistent with what Professor Langevoort has
referred to as the SEC's "myth story" of the earnest, rational retail investor, pleases few.
In one camp are those who believe that the trained, professional investor, if not the market
itself, should be considered the reasonable investor-not retail investors, however rational
they are imagined to be.82 This argument can be cast in both descriptive and normative
terms. Descriptively, the claim is that the vast majority of retail investors do not pay
attention to, let alone rely on, corporate disclosures; rather, they are passive price-takers
who rely on professional investors to seek out and trade on information and, by so doing,
push prices to accurate levels.83 Thus, the argument goes, the professional trader's vantage

76. Margaret V. Sachs, Materialityand Social Change: The Case for Replacing "the Reasonable Investor"
with "the Least SophisticatedInvestor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 475-79 (2006) (citing Levitin
v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); Itarris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 (1 ith Cir. 1999);
Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204,1213 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1994)).
77. Black, supra note 75 at 1494 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 234, and Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169,
1175 (7th Cir. 1987)).
78. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
79. Black, supra note 75, at 1494.
80. See Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (observing, in the proxy fraud
context, that publishing accurate facts can negate the materiality of a false statement, but observing that "not every
mixture of the true will neutralize the deception"; "[i]f it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between
the one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow").
81. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to
Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. L. REV. 135, 173 (2002) [hereinafter Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits].
82. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 518 (2013); John M.
Newman Jr. et al., Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the
"Misleading"and "Materiality"Elements ofSecurities FraudClaims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571 (1995); Dennis, supra
note 75.
83. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 693-95 (1984) (explaining that unsophisticated investors can take "a free ride on
the information impounded by the market: they get the same price received by the professional traders without
having to do any of the work of learning information"); Newman Jr. et al., supra note 82, at 574 (citing evidence
that it is "market professionals, and not individual stockholders, who set the price of securities"); see also Alicia
Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009) ("There is no question that
U.S. securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors."); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail
Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Retail Investors] ("The last thirty years or so have brought a rapid shift toward institutionalization in
the financial markets in the United States-in other words, a shift toward investment by mutual funds, pension
funds, insurance companies, bank trust departments, and the like. That the market for corporate securities traded
on the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Global Market is no longer substantially retail in nature is
now common knowledge.").
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point is the appropriate one to take in considering the interpretation and importance of
corporate disclosures. 84 This argument has particular force in secondary-market fraud
cases brought pursuant to Rule 1Ob-5, because plaintiffs themselves concede it in order to
avoid proving actual reliance: under the so-called fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance,8 5
plaintiffs are presumed to have relied not on the challenged disclosure directly, but rather
on the integrity of the implicated security's market price, which is itself presumed to have
been distorted by the challenged disclosure through the trading activity of market
But the argument also has force in Section 11 cases, which involve
professionals.
registered public offerings; although prices in such offerings are not directly set by
secondary market trading activity, underwriters set prices based on an understanding of
what sophisticated institutional investors-the major participants in registered public
offerings-are willing to pay. Normatively, the claim is that the law should not endorse a
conception of the reasonable investor that might encourage retail investors to engage in
stock picking, a practice that modern portfolio theory teaches is a losing proposition for all
but the quickest and savviest.
In another camp are those who criticize the assumption of rationality that underlies
judicial conceptions of the reasonable investor. In the spirit of behavioral critiques of the
Hand Formula in tort, these scholars point to mounting evidence that real investors lackthe ability to comprehend and synthesize information in a perfect and dispassionate
manner, and instead allow emotions, biases, and irrelevant stimuli to affect their investment
choices.88 Descriptively, the import of this claim is clear: the rational retail investor

84. This argument clearly does not extend to communications that are specifically targeted at retail
investors-such as marketing materials disseminated by mutual funds and brokers. See infra text accompanying
notes 208-212.
85. The fraud-on-the-market theory was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988). It was recently reaffirmed in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
86. See, e.g., Newman Jr. et al., supranote 82, at 572 ("In modem securities markets, prices are determined
not by individual amateur investors, but rather by investment professionals. A piece of alleged misinformation
will not affect the price of a security when it is not believed by professional investors, or is thought by them to be
unimportant. This is true no matter how the information might be perceived by a more generalized, hypothetical
'reasonable investor."'); Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 66, at 105 ("[Olpen market fraud leads purchasers
and sellers to trade in organized markets, where the ability of any given trader to affect the price at which the
transaction occurs is minimal. Ifthe market is characterized by a high level ofefficiency, the orthodox assumption
is that smart money dominates so that even if less sophisticated investors are fooled by some publicity, stock
prices stay in line with assessments of fundamental value based on all publicly available information. Hence the
average investor, even if fooled, is not significantly harmed.").
87. See, e.g., Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 175 (observing that the SEC's
message of empowerment to retail investors presents risks by fueling overconfidence about their ability to
participate profitably in the capital markets).
88. See, e.g., Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, supra note 75, at 543 (reviewing
behavioralism literature argued to "undermine[] traditional assumptions of shareholder rationality"); Black, supra
note 75, at 1496-97 ("Behavioral economists. . . do not observe real people investing in today's markets behaving
as the reasonable investors that federal securities law expects them to be . ... To date, courts have not
acknowledged this gap between judicial expectations about the behavior of reasonable investors and behavioral
economists' views of investors' cognitive shortcomings."); Lin, The New Investor, supra note 74, at 699 (noting
the disconnect between the reasonable investor, imagined as a rational economic actor, and the real human
investor, plagued by irrational biases and heuristics, but noting that "most of the regulatory framework continues
to exist for the mythical, rational investor"). For an overview of evidence related to investor biases, see
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envisioned, however murkily, in judicial opinions may simply not exist. Normatively, the
import is less clear. One possible implication, suggested by some, is that the law ought to
recognize and incorporate behavioral biases into the reasonable investor standard. But
this response encounters difficulties related to both feasibility and desirability. As
Professors Choi and Pritchard have observed, "[a]djusting information disclosure to
ameliorate behavioral biases of investors is a difficult and error-prone task." 90 Moreover,
doing so could have bad public policy consequences, if it leads investors to be less skeptical
in interpreting information and thus more exposed to fraud, or if "limiting information
flows for the benefit of the behaviorally challenged [] undermine[s] the ability of more
rational investors to value securities accurately." Another possible normative takeaway
of the behavioral critique is that it renders the "professional trader" and/or market-based
conception of the reasonable investor, outlined above, all the more compelling. This
assumes that professional traders are less prone to behavioral biases than retail investors
and/or that such biases are likely to be largely washed out at the market level. 92 Promotion
of retail investor education is yet another possible policy response to behavioral critiques

Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 139-47; Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for
Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REv. 325, 340-49 (2011) [hereinafter Lin, Behavioral Framework]; Hoffman,
"Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, supra note 75, at 549-62, 562.
89. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of
Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 112 (2005) (arguing that behavioral
insights counsel in favor of a "new definition for the materiality of information which focuses on the magnitude
of the risky outcomes and on the degree or vividness of mental imagery"; "[in other words, determinations of
materiality would and should depend not just on the cognitive form and content of information, but also upon the
affective form or presentation and emotional content of that information").
90. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 61 (2003);
accord Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 138 (accepting the behavioralist view but
observing that positive strategies "are hard to craft precisely because the altemative behavioral theories in the
literature are so tentative"); Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 66, at 109 ("If we relax the assumption of market
rationality, we enter into a normative freefall, for we can then assume nearly any level of foolishness in drawing
inferences."); see also Huang, supra note 89, at 121 (observing that the "contrast effect" and "recentness effect"
suggest that negative information that follows positive information will be given more attention by moody
investors, whereas the "primacy effect" and "priming effect" suggests the opposite).
91. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 90, at 50, 61; Langevoort, Half-Truths, supra note 66, at 111 (observing
that one "might say that the costs associated with intervening to help noise traders exceed whatever social benefit
(if any) we might anticipate from the intervention, or that withholding assistance might encourage noise traders
to be more careful"); cf Huang, supra note 89, at 111 ("Courts have not eliminated and will not even necessarily
reduce moody investing [simply] by holding that moody investing behavior is not reasonable, especially if moody
investing is prevalent and unconscious.").
92. While widely held views, some question the validity of these assumptions. See, e.g., Huang,supra note
89, at 103 (surveying empirical data that non-cognitive investing "not only occurs, but also affects securities
prices and market performance"); Hoffman, "Duty " To BeA Rational Shareholder, supranote 75, at 549 (arguing
that behavioral biases will not always be washed out in the capital markets); Langevoort, Taming the Animal
Spirits, supra note 81, at 143 (observing that if the cognitive biases of investors "are systematic enough they will
have an impact on prices that others do not arbitrage away"); see also id, at 148-52 (surveying arguments
proffered in response to claims that inefficiencies in the market will be eliminated through arbitrage activities by
the "smart money" and through use of de-biasing investment advice); Lin, Behavioral Framework, supra note
88, at 374-76 (noting that "[c]ritiques of behavioral approaches to securities regulation have suggested that such
approaches are futile and unnecessary because arbitrage and efficient markets can adequately protect investors,"
but arguing that "arbitrage alone cannot fully address securities risk").
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of the reasonable investor standard, one that would not necessitate any change to the
standard itself. 93

B. The Role of Context
Many complain that the murky and arguably incoherent image of the reasonable
investor painted by the case law makes it difficult for corporate issuers and their agents to
both make disclosure choices ex ante and to defend those choices ex post, when confronted
with litigation. 94 This difficulty is exacerbated by the highly contextual nature of the
inquiry called for by the reasonable investor standard.9 5
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the need for such an inquiry. For example,
in TSC the Court explained that
the underlying objective facts, which will often be free from dispute, are merely
the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality. The determination
requires delicate assessments of the inferences a "reasonable shareholder" would
draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him,
and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact. 96
In Basic, the Court again endorsed a "fact-specific inquiry" into materiality. 97 Basic
involved the materiality standard for merger negotiations; the Court held that a reasonable
investor would consider both the probability of the merger being consummated and its
magnitude, if consummated, in judging the importance of the information. 98 Thus, the
Court instructed,
[w]hether merger discussions in any particular case are material. . .depends on
the facts. Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will occur, a
factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest
corporate levels. Without attempting to catalog all such possible factors, we note
by way of example that board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers,

93. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 74, at 330-31 (observing that "barriers to knowledge and
understanding (even barriers created by cognitive biases) may be overcome with targeted investor education.");
but cf Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 187-88 (expressing doubt about the ability of
investor education to successfully de-bias investors).
94. See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 65, at 319 (observing that materiality "is a notoriously slippery concept,
unpredictable and elusive in application" and asserting that the "continuing uncertainty has increased the cost of
generating and verifying financial information and has added to the amount of litigation burdening the corporate
world"); Lee, supra note 64, at 675 ("Generally, practitioners and issuers' legal counsel are perplexed by the
elusiveness of the 'materiality' standard."); Dennis, supra note 75, at 385 ("Courts and commentators have
expressed considerable frustration with the application of the legal test of materiality."); Booth, supra note 80, at
518 ("the courts have struggled mightily to determine when a fact is material . .. ").
95. See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 65, at 319 ("Materiality determinations in individual cases tend to be so
fact-specific that the accumulated body of published case law provides limited guidance for decision-making.");
id. at 321 ("Determining which facts if added, singly or in combination, to the 'total mix' of available information
would have been important to investors in a specific stock on a specific day is a highly circumstantial inquiry.");
see also Lee, supranote 64, at 674-75 (discussing how context can influence a materiality determination).
96. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
97. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988).
98. Id. at 238.
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and actual negotiations between principals or their intermediaries may serve as
indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the
securities allegedly manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider such facts as
the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market
value. 99

"No particular event or factor short of closing the transaction," the Court concluded, "need
be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material."' 00
More recently, the Court in Omnicare once again emphasized the fact-specific nature
of the reasonable investor inquiry. In determining whether a statement of opinion is
misleading, the Court explained that a reasonable investor would consider it in its "full
context.' 0 An opinion statement "is not necessarily misleading when an issuer knows,
but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way," because "[r]easonable investors
understand that opinions sometimes rest on a weighing of competing facts; indeed, the
presence of such facts is one reason why an issuer may frame a statement as an opinion,
thus conveying uncertainty."l02 A reasonable investor would take a more discerning
approach, the Court explained, paying attention to the specificity of the opinion, the type
of document it appears in, "customs and practices of the relevant industries," and the
"surrounding text, including hedges, disclaimers, and apparently conflicting information,"
among other factors. o3
C. Companies'Pleafor Bright-Line Rules
The indeterminacy generated by the fact-specific nature of the reasonable investor
standard has frustrated public companies and their advisors for decades. These parties
complain that the standard provides them with too little guidance for making disclosure
choices and fosters frivolous litigation.104 Their preferred fix: replace the reasonable
investor standard with bright-line rules. 105 Neither the SEC nor the Supreme Court has
been receptive to their pleas.1 06
To the contrary, in 1999 the SEC responded to the growing use of quantitative
materiality benchmarks by issuing a bulletin expressly rejecting the practice. In SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin: No. 99-Materiality("SAB 99"), the SEC staff stated its position that

99. Id. at 239.
100. Id.
101. Omnicare, Inc., v, Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1330 (2015).
102. Id. at 1329.
103. Id. at 1329 n.8 & 1330.
104. See supranote 95; see also Langevoort, Half-Truths, supranote 66, at 125 (observing that there is little
excuse for the "opaqueness in legislative or administrative policy and de facto delegation to the judiciary," and
suggesting that affirmative disclosure obligations be more carefully crafted).
105. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 64, at 667 (discussing issuers' and auditors' preference for bright-line
quantitative tests of materiality); see also James J. Park, Assessing the MaterialityofFinancialMisstatements, 34
J. CORP. L. 513 (2009) (arguing that issuer liability in fraud-on-the-market cases be limited to quantitatively large
misstatements).
106. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 64, at 667 (discussing the SEC's rejection of a bright-line approach in SAB
99); Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supra note 75, at 154 ("the Supreme Court has ... warned against the use of
bright-line rules").
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public companies and their auditors may not assume the immateriality of financial
statement items that fall below any particular percentage threshold; instead, SAB 99
instructs that the magnitude of an item "is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality;
it cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant
considerations."
Qualitative factors that speak "to the factual context in which the user
of financial statements would view the financial statement item" must also be
considered.08 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had earlier taken a
similar position, announcing in its Statement ofFinancialAccounting Concepts Statement
No. 2. that "no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account all
the considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment." 109
Although SAB 99 was issued with the laudable purpose of deterring earnings
management,1 10 and provided some guidance on the qualitative factors that should be
looked to in determining the materiality of financial statement items,"1 it received an
incredibly harsh reception by the industry. As one treatise explains, "[d]espite the SEC's
good intentions in providing guidance, SAB 99's push for 'qualitative materiality' has been
roundly criticized" as "excessively unclear and 'nebulous' and as "vague and impossible
to implement." 1 12 This has led "practitioners and financial professionals [to push] for 'a

107. See SAB 99, supra note 16, at 45, 151. For a more fulsome description of SAB 99, see Sauer, supra
note 65, at 336-41, and Glenn F. Miller, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray Into the
Murky World of QualitativeMateriality,95 Nw. U. L. REv. 361, 378-82 (2000). Prior to SAB 99, quantitative
standards were more commonly employed, and earlier efforts by the SEC to adopt a qualitative approach to
materiality were rebuffed by the courts. For this history, see John M. Fedders, QualitativeMateriality: The Birth,
Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (1998) (discussing the SEC's efforts
in the wake of Watergate to adopt qualitative standards of materiality focused on corporate ethics). See also
Redwood, supra note 61, at 338-60 (recounting the rise and fall of qualitative materiality as it concerns issues
related to corporate integrity).

108. Id.
109. See FASB, supra note 65, 131.
110. SAB 99 was released in the wake of a speech by then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt calling out
companies for engaging in earnings management. As Levitt explained:
[C]ompanies misuse the concept of materiality. They intentionally record errors within a defined
percentage ceiling. They then try to excuse that fib by arguing that the effect on the bottom line is
too small to matter. If that's the case, why do they work so hard to create these errors? Maybe
because the effect can matter, especially if it picks up that last penny of the consensus estimate. When
either management or the outside auditors are questioned about these clear violations of GAAP, they
answer sheepishly. . . "It doesn't matter. It's immaterial."
Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at the N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
See also Park, supra note 105, at 517
(observing that "critics of the qualitative standard do little to acknowledge that a quantitative standard can be a
blank check for earnings manipulation").
I l SAB 99, supra note 16 at 45, 152 (offering a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that may affect the
materiality of quantitatively small misstatements). Additional guidance on materiality, also of limited usefulness,
has been provided by the SEC and FASB. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading; Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716, 51,721,51,722 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249); FASB, supra note
65.
112. CARLA GARRETT ET AL., LAWYERS GUIOE TO FORMULAS IN DEAL DocuMENTs AND SEC FILINGS
§ 6.11 (2016). See also Kenneth C. Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and ProtectingMateriality Standards in
Financial Statements: A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 55 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1050 (2000)
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clearer and more rational basis for assessing materiality with respect to financial
misstatements."' 13
Thus far, their efforts have not been rewarded by the Supreme Court. Instead, the
Supreme Court has taken every opportunity it has been presented with to reject bright-line
alternatives to the reasonable investor standard. In Basic, for example, the Court rejected
the defendants' preferred "agreement-in-principle" test, under which preliminary merger
negotiations would be deemed immaterial unless and until an agreement-in-principle had
been reached between the parties related to price and deal structure. 1 The Court
acknowledged that a "bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires
the exercise of judgment in light of all the circumstances," but declined to adopt it, noting
that "[alny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of
an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality must necessarily be over- or underinclusive." 1 5 The Court again declined to adopt a bright-line standard for materiality in
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano. The defendant in that case argued for a rule that
would render adverse events allegedly caused by a pharmaceutical product immaterial as
a matter of law if too few in number to establish a statistically significant risk of causation;
such an approach, the Court explained, would be at odds with the contextual inquiry called
for by the reasonable investor standard. 17 Most recently, the Court in Omnicare rejected
the defendant's position that "no reasonable person, in any context, can understand a
statement of opinion to convey anything more than the speaker's own mindset," adopting
instead the highly contextualized approach to the question of an opinion's
"misleadingness" described above."1 18
The lower courts have proven a more sympathetic audience for industry's complaints.
A variety of judge-made doctrines have developed which deem particular types of
statements immaterial as a matter of law, allowing courts to dismiss claims on materiality
grounds before trial. These include the "puffery doctrine" (according to which "statements
that are too vague, promotional, or hyperbolic constitute mere puffery and are therefore
immaterial as a matter of law"1 19), the "bespeaks caution doctrine" (according to which
("Although the Commission attempts [in SAB 99] to clarify the materiality standard by eliminating the sole use
of quantitative thresholds, the SEC actually blurs the lines for issuers and raises more questions than it answers.");
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 453, 523 (2015)
(observing that SAB 99 "has been heavily criticized as nebulous"); Miller, supra note 107, at 396 ("By ending
the custom of exclusive reliance on quantitative factors in making the materiality assessment and substituting a
qualitative approach, SAB No. 99 greatly complicates the financial reporting process. It replaces a binary decision
based on rigid, numerical benchmarks with a fluid, subjective decision, which may result in confusion and
inconsistency in disclosure.").
113. GARRETT ET AL., supranote 112.
114. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 233 (1988).
115. Id. at 236.
116. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
117. Id. at 1321.
118. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
119. Huang, supra note 89, at 113. For background on the puffery doctrine, see Padfield, Is Puffery Material,
supra note 74 at 350-53, and Adi Osovsky, Puffery on the Market: A Behavioral Economic Analysis of the
manuscript) (May 2015),
4-13 (unpublished
Puffery Defense in the Securities Arena
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2603051. For an overview and examples of the courts'
application of the puffery defense to both brokers and issuers, see Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrectionof the Dodo:
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forward-looking representations will be deemed immaterial as a matter of law if
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language or risk disclosure 20), and the "truth on the
market doctrine" (according to which a court will presume immateriality if "the allegedly
misrepresented or omitted information was actually known to the 'smart money' segment
of the marketplace" 21), among others.122 Many scholars believe that judges use these
doctrines "as a safet valve for frivolous litigation, which is only effective if the pressure
is released pretrial."
These "safety valve" doctrines clearly stand in tension with the Supreme Court
precedent discussed above. Because it turns on a "delicate assessment" of inferences to be
drawn from highly contextualized facts, the reasonable investor standard is rarely
appropriately decided as a matter of law. In TSC, the Court instructed that only if the
challenged disclosures are "so obviously important [or unimportant] to an investor, that
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality is the ultimate issue of
materiality appropriately resolved as a matter of law.''l24 Indeed, the Court observed that
in the "analogous context" of negligence, "the jury's unique competence in applying the

The UnfortunateRe-emergence of the Puffery Defense in PrivateSecuritiesFraudActions, 59 OHio ST. L.J. 1697,
1706-15 (1998).
120. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution, " 49 BUS. LAw. 481, 482 (1994)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Disclosures that Bespeak Caution]. For a description of this doctrine, see Jennifer
O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PItT. L. REv. 619
(1997).
121. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 177.
122. See Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, supra note 75, at 575-82 (discussing various
additional techniques that courts use to decide materiality as a matter of law, including: (1) the "zero price change"
rationale, under which courts dismiss claims where the alleged misstatement had no market effect; (2) the "trivial
matters" rationale, under which courts dismiss claims involving nondisclosures relating to small percentages of
total sales or revenues; (3) the "duty to read" rationale, under which courts hold an oral or written statement
immaterial as a matter of law because other corporate disclosures negated its significance; and (4) the "understand
consequences" rationale, under which courts dismiss claims where alleged omissions should have been inferred
from the information actually disclosed); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities FraudOpinions, 51 EMORY
LJ. 83, 119-25 (2002) (same); Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? MaterialityIssues in Disclosures
that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 927 (2007) [hereinafter Padfield, Who
Should Do the Math?] (discussing the so-called "simple math" rule).
123. Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supra note 75, at 154; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in
Santa Fe's Shadow: the SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 479 (2001)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight] ("One cannot read the case law under Rule lOb-5 since 1975 without
a palpable sense that lawmaking has been driven by a fear of speculative litigation that had to be deterred, even
at the price of making good cases harder to bring. . .. Most potently, perhaps, has been its influence in the
development of entirely new (or reinvented) doctrines under the securities laws, [such as] the 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine [and] the reinvigoration of an extraordinarily powerful 'mere puffery' defense"); cf Bainbridge & Gulati,
supra note 122, at 121-22 (describing the theory that "judges are using puffery to effect a policy agenda of
limiting a class of cases perceived as frivolous" as plausible, but finding it ultimately less convincing than the
theory that judges, facing various institutional constraints, use decision-making heuristics to rid themselves of
complex cases early in the litigation); Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder,supra note 75, 569-74
(evaluating various hypotheses for courts' use of these doctrines, including the 'corporate activity' hypothesis,
the 'conservative' and 'lazy judges' hypothesis, and the 'docket-pruning' hypothesis).
124. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (internal quotations omitted).
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'reasonable man' standard is thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment."l 25 This
has led courts to "utter a common refrain asserting that the analysis of materiality is
extremely fact-intensive and thus is rarely to be decided on the basis of pretrial motions to
dismiss or summary judgment."l26 Yet the doctrines described above are far from rarely
invoked; to the contrary, they are increasingly used to dispose of close cases. 127
This phenomenon has been the subject of substantial academic criticism. Scholars
contend that courts' aggressive use of these doctrines is lawless-not merely in the sense
that it contravenes Supreme Court precedent, but also in the sense that it leads to poor and
unprincipled decisions.128 For example, Professors Bainbridge and Gulati mock the idea
that "judges possess the sophisticated understanding of investor behavior and market
dynamics necessary to validate" these doctrines, given their lack of financial expertise and
routine failure to consult the financial economics literature or any actual evidence of

125. Id. at 450 n.12.
126. Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supranote 75, at 153-54; In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109,
1113 (9th Cir. 1989) (determination of materiality in securities fraud cases "should ordinarily be left to the trier
of fact"); see also Booth, supra note 82, at 536 ("the Court has effectively prohibited summary judgment on the
question of materiality"); Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, supra note 75, at 541 (the
"[cionventional wisdom" that "materiality issues in securities cases are almost always left for jury resolution").
127. See, e.g., Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A RationalShareholder, supra note 75, at 564, 585 (finding, in a
sample of 385 securities cases involving a holding on materiality, that courts found at least one claim immaterial
as a matter of law in 44% of all cases and in 51% of cases brought by a private plaintiff); Bainbridge & Gulati,
supra note 122, at 116 n.94 ("[A]ccording to our survey of opinions, the question of materiality that is 'ordinarily'
to be a question for the trier of fact and is to be decided in favor of the defendant at a threshold stage only if it is
so 'obvious' that reasonable minds could not differ, turns out to be the subject of extensive [pretrial] discussion
in the majority of cases. Of the 91 (out of 100) cases that were decided at the motion to dismiss stage, 64 involved
materiality determinations in favor of the defendants (i.e., over 70%). In other words, what is supposed to be rare
and unusual, turns out to be routine."); Osovsky, supra note 119, at 13-14 (empirical study finding 233 securities
cases mentioning the puffery defense in the five year period 2009-2013; of these, 73% (171 cases) accepted the
defense); Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World ofSecurities Fraudin Eighty Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 553, 559 (2014) (analyzing 80 opinions on motions to dismiss securities fraud class actions that were
issued in 2013 and finding that in 19% of the opinions courts granted dismissal, at least in part, on the basis that
a representation was immaterial as a matter of law); see also Padfield,Is Puffery Material, supranote 74, at 340
("materiality is often resolved pretrial"); Osovsky, supra note 119, at 14 (noting the "rising popularity of the
puffery defense in the last three decades"); Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight, supra note 123, at 479 (noting the
"stunning willingness of judges to decide difficult materiality issues 'as a matter of law').
128. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The Best Pujery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1395, 1397 (2006)
[hereinafter Hoffman, Best Puffery Article Ever] (noting that "many jurists [have] conclude[d] that the puffery
defense is lawless"); Osovsky, supra note 119, at I (empirical study finding that court decisions on puffery tend
to "lack reasoned analysis"); O'Hare, supra note 119, at 1722-26 (arguing that the puffery defense should not be
applied in securities cases at all, because it is based on a policy of caveat emptor which has been rejected by the
federal securities laws); id. at 1726-27 (criticizing courts invoking the puffery defense for relying "almost
exclusively on the words of the company's statement, while ignoring other factors that might lead a reasonable
investor to conclude that the statement was important to the investment decision"); Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A
Rational Shareholder,supra note 75, at 586-90 (arguing that behavioral insights undermine assumptions about
investor behavior that underlie the puffery and bespeaks caution doctrines); Padfield, Is PufJeryMaterial, supra
note 74, at 357-61 (noting the criticism that the puffery doctrine is inconsistent with the weight real investors
actually place on vague corporate statements); cf Osovsky, supra note 119, at 1 (finding, based on survey
evidence, "that the courts' assumption that puffery statements do not affect investment decisions is correct in
most instances" but warning that "a cautious analysis" is called for with respect to "strong puffery statements"),
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investor behavior in making materiality determinations. 129 Professor Hoffman similarly
complains that iudges frequently make materiality determinations based on little more than
"judicial hunches,",130 "treat[ing] puffery doctrine as a kind of semantic inquiry" rather
than "considering evidence of actual [investor] reaction to puffing speech."13 1 "[T]his
interpretative approach," he warns, "has led authorities to adopt a distorted view" of
investor behavior.132 Professor Langevoort has similarly warned that judges deciding
questions of materiality without the benefit of evidence "have little choice but to draw
implicitly on their own knowledge and experience," which "introduces a serious risk of
unconscious bias."

133

Until recently, district courts would also occasionally decide materiality at the class
certification stage. In Rule lOb-5 cases alleging misrepresentations, the fraud-on-themarket (FOTM) presumption of reliance is key to class certification; without it
individualized issues of reliance would overwhelm common ones, in contravention of the
predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).1 34 Because
materiality is one of the prerequisites for invoking the FOTM presumption,1 3 5 courts
sometimes insisted that plaintiffs prove it in order to obtain certification, even though
materiality is also an element of a Rule lOb-5 claim on the merits. 136 In Amgen Inc. v.
ConnecticutRetirement Plansand Trust Funds the Supreme Court shut this practice down,
holding that although materiality must be shown for the FOTM presumption to apply, it
should not be adjudicated as part of class certification. 137 Reserving the issue for trial does

129. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 122, at 120-21; see also id. at 137-38 (warning that judges use of
materiality-heuristics can lead to skewed and mediocre doctrine and create safe harbors for bad behavior).
130. Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder,supra note 75, at 607.
131. Hoffman, Best Puffery Article Ever, supranote 128, at 1440.
132. Id.
133. Langevoort, Disclosuresthat Bespeak Caution,supra note 120, at 493. Some scholars have also argued
that when courts invoke these doctrines to rule on materiality at the pretrial phase, they improperly usurp the role
ofthe jury. See, e.g., Huang, supranote 89, at 117; Osovsky, supra note 119, at 18. This complaint is somewhat
specious, however. The reality is that if the reasonable investor standard is not applied by the court prior to trial,
it will in all likelihood not be applied at all. This is because, if not dismissed pretrial, securities class actions
almost inevitably settle. See, e.g., Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 178 n. 181. The size
of the potential liability, combined with the uncertainty of the outcome, makes trial simply too great a risk from
the viewpoint of corporate defendants and those who advise them. See, e.g., Padfield, Who ShouldDo the Math?,
supranote 122, at 945. This, in turn, may encourage the filing ofborderline cases. As explained above, judicial
concern with this reality has likely spurred the development of the "safety valve" doctrines in the first place. See
supranote 123 and accompanying text.
134. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). The FOTM presumption is not required to certify a
Rule lOb-5 class action alleging omissions, because in such cases positive proof of reliance need not be shown.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Nor is it required to certify a Section 11 class
action, since reliance is not an element under Section I1. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998).
135. To invoke the FOTM presumption, plaintiffs must show "(1) that the alleged misrepresentations were
publicly known, (2) that they were material, (3) that the stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) that the
plaintiffs traded the stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed."
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014).
136. See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484-86 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2008); see
also In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631-32, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that plaintiff need not prove
materiality before class certification, but defendant may present rebuttal evidence on the issue).
137. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.Plans and Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
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not offend Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the Court explained, because a
failure of proof on the element would not result in "'some fatal dissimilarity' among class
members that would make use of the class-action device inefficient or unfair." 1 38 To the
contrary, "falbsent proof of materiality, the claim of the Rule lOb-5 class will fail in
its entirety; there will be no remaining individual questions to adjudicate."l 39
The Amgen Court was not swayed by the defendant's argument that reserving the
materiality determination for trial would foster strike suits, noting that Congress had
already taken steps to curb abusive securities litigation in the PSLRA.1 40 "We have no
warrant to encumber securities-fraud litigation by adopting an atextual requirement of
precertification proof of materiality that Congress, despite its extensive involvement in the
securities field, has not sanctioned," the Court wrote. 14 1 The impact of Congress'
enactment of the PSLRA on the debate over the reasonable investor test is considered more
fully below.
D. The Impact of the PSLRA
Some contend that concerns about the vagueness of the reasonable investor standard
are overblown in light of reforms enacted by the PSLRA. Specifically, it has been argued
that in light of the PSLRA's heightened scienter pleading requirement, the materiality
element of the Rule I Ob-5 cause of action has waned in functional importance.1 42 After all,
if someone intentionally or recklessly made a false statement, the fact that the statement
may have been immaterial hardly seems to excuse the behavior; it is only when we do not
trust the scienter screen that materiality serves as an important safeguard against truly nonmeritorious suits. 143 While there is some force to this argument, it takes too narrow a view.

For several reasons, complaints about the vagueness of the reasonable investor standard
continue to merit thoughtful consideration in a post-PSLRA world. 144
138. Id. at 1197 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age ofAggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 97, 107 (2009)).
139. Id. at 1196.
140. See id. at 1199-1202; cf id. at 1206 (Scalia. J., dissenting) ("Certification of the class is often, if not
usually, the prelude to a substantial settlement by the defendant because the costs and risks of litigating further
are so high.").
141. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1202 (2013).
142. Padfield, Immaterial Lies, supra note 75, at 144, 180-93.
143. It is a small burden to avoid intentional or reckless misstatements. It is quite another to avoid innocent
misstatements, which is what a potential Rule lOb-5 defendant who feared misapplication of Rule lOb-5's scienter
requirement might strive to do. In such a situation, the materiality element offers relief. As Richard Sauer has
explained, "[a]llowing a margin of error avoids costly efforts to measure the trivial or inherently subjective aspects
of business activity. That margin is important not only to managers, who should be primarily engaged in
improving, rather than measuring, the performance of their companies, but also to auditors, who are called upon
to assess the reliability of financial statements through procedures that can never provide absolute certainty."
Sauer, supra note 65, at 318.
144. To be sure, the merits likely matter more to the outcome of securities class actions than they did prior
to the adoption of the PSLRA, although empirical attempts to quantify the impact of the merits on settlements are
fraught with difficulty. See generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND, L.
REV. 1465, 1477-98 (2004) (surveying empirical work examining the impact of the PSLRA). But qualitative
research suggests that non-merits factors continue to play a role in settlement negotiations (Tom Baker & Sean
Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L.

2017]1

The "ReasonableInvestor" ofFederalSecurities Law

I 01

Recall, for example, that the reasonable investor standard defines the concept of
"misleadingness" as well as the element of materiality. As explained above, whether a
defendant should be held liable for a statement that is not in itself a misstatement of fact,
but which is alleged to be misleading because of the omission of other information, requires
the fact finder to assess what a reasonable investor would infer from the statement standing
alone. If it is difficult to predict the outcome of that determination, an issuer might decide
to omit the statement altogether, or alternatively to disclose additional extraneous facts out
of an abundance of caution-either approach risks reducing the usefulness of corporate
disclosures to investors. The heightened scienter pleading required of Rule 1 Ob-5 plaintiffs
under the PSLRA provides little comfort to issuers in this situation. Whereas that
requirement creates a real barrier to frivolous claims alleging that defendants knew, or were
reckless in not knowing, the falsity of an affirmative misstatement, scienter operates
differently in half-truth cases. In such cases, scienter turns on whether the defendant knew,
or was reckless in not knowing, that a reasonable investor would have viewed the
challenged statement as misleading. Thus, as a practical matter, scienter takes a backseat
to the reasonable investor inquiry.
The same can be said with respect to pure omission claims. As explained at the outset
of Part III, mandatory disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws are often by
their terms limited to "material" information. For example, Item 303(a)(1) of Regulation
S-K requires disclosure of known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties
likely to result in a company's liquidity changing "in any material way." 1 45 The scienter
issue in pure omissions cases thus tends to devolve into the question of whether the issuer
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, the materiality of the omitted item-viz., whether a
reasonable investor would have considered the information important. Uncertainty
surrounding the concept of the reasonable investor may therefore result in excessive
disclosure, as companies attempt to avoid litigation.146
Scienter is not even an element of plaintiffs' prima facie case under Section 11, so the
PSLRA's heightened scienter pleading requirement plays no role at all in this type of
litigation.147 A plaintiffs' prima face case in a Section 11 case turns almost entirely on
whether the plaintiff can plead and prove that the issuer's registration statement contained
a material misstatement of fact, a materially misleading "half-truth," and/or the omission
of a material fact required to be stated therein.148 One may rightly have little patience for

REv. 755, 823 (2009)), something that standard theoretical models of frivolous litigation would predict (see, e.g.,
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certificationand the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 12941301 (2002) (discussing these models)).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2017). Whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose that is actionable under
Rule 1Ob-5 is a question currently pending before the United States Supreme Court. See Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub.
Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017).
146. As a former SEC chairperson recently remarked, "ever-increasing amounts of disclosure make it
difficult for an investor to wade through the volume of information she receives to ferret out the information that
is most relevant." Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, Speech at the National
Association
of
Corporate
Directors-Leadership
Conference
(Oct.
15,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806.
147. Section 11 imposes strict liability on issuer defendants; other Section I1 defendants may raise due
diligence as an affirmative defense. See 15 U.S.C. §77k (1998).
148. Plaintiffs in Section II cases need not prove reliance or causation as part of their prima facie case. See

102

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 43:1

misstatements of fact in a registration statement, even if legally "immaterial," given the
careful fact-checking that should accompany the statement's preparation. But liability for
half-truths and omissions is much harder (and more costly) for an issuer to protect against,
and given the extremely large damage awards available to plaintiffs in Section 11 class
actions, raises legitimate over-deterrence concerns. 149
It might also be noted that the SEC is not bound by the PSLRA's heightened pleading
requirements when it brings suit under Rule I Ob-5, just as it is not so bound when it brings
negligence-based claims for material misrepresentations, half-truths and omissions
pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.150 But the SEC's freedom from the
strictures of the PSLRA is of lesser significance than the points made above. It is the fear
of frivolous securities class actions, far more than the fear of frivolous SEC-enforcement
actions, which animates concerns about the vagueness of the reasonable investor test.
Consistent with this conventional wisdom, empirical research shows that courts invoke the
materiality "safety valve" doctrines discussed above with dramatically greater frequency
in lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs relative to cases brought by the SEC.151
The prevalent use of these safety-valve doctrines brings up a final point that warrants
emphasis: regardless of the true strength of company complaints about the reasonable
investor standard, the lower courts appear to be responding to them by invoking
"immaterial as a matter of law" doctrines to dismiss securities class actions at alarming
rates. 152 This alone warrants taking a critical look at the arguments being advanced.
IV. THE REASONABLE INVESTOR VS. THE REASONABLE PERSON

Both critics and defenders of the reasonable investor test have tended to cast their
arguments in terms of the perennial "rules versus standards" debate. The tradeoffs
occasioned by the choice between rules and standards are well-trodden territory in the legal
literaturel 53 : relative to standards, rules may invoke greater compliance by regulated
parties because more certain, 154 but are also likely to be under- and over-inclusive, such
that the compliance achieved may deviate in significant ways from what is socially
optimal 15 5 ; rules are more costly than standards to develop ex ante, but are far cheaper to

id.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012) (detailing the measure of damages); see also Joseph A. Grundfest,
Morrison, the RestrictedScope of Securities Act Section 1] Liability, and ProspectsforRegulatory Reform, 41 J.
CORP. L. 1, 3 (2015) (observing that "Section 11 liability is the source of many of the largest class action securities
recoveries in history").
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2010).
151. See Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A RationalShareholder, supra note 75, at 567-68 (finding, in sample of
385 securities cases involving a holding on materiality, that courts found at least one claim immaterial as a matter
of law in 50.9% of cases brought by private plaintiffs as compared to only 6.5% of cases brought by the SEC).
152. See supra notes 123 & 127.
153. For helpful overviews, see FRANCESCO PARISI & ViNCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 9-29
(2009); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV, 165, 172-181 (2015); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 57-69 (1992).
154. See, e.g., Issac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 262 (1974).
155. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 154, at 268; Sullivan, supra note 153, at 62-63, 66.
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apply ex post1 56; rules do a better job of limiting frivolous litigation as well as cabining
judicial discretion than standards, 7 but the rigidity rules im ose on enforcers and factfinders may lead to undesirable outcomes in specific cases.
Measuring these tradeoffs
with any level of precision is, however, usually impossible. And although much scholarly
ink has been spilt elaborating the factors that influence the magnitude of the costs and
benefits associated with the specificity of a legal command, 159 these factors fail to point in
a single direction when applied to the reasonable investor test.160 Thus, so long as the
reasonable investor debate continues to be argued in simplistic terms of rules versus
standards-with market participants complaining of the uncertainty generated by the
reasonable investor standard and the SEC and Supreme Court warning of the underinclusiveness of the bright-line rules offered to replace it-the debate will prove
intractable.
This Article approaches the issue differently, considering what, if anything, we might
learn from the reasonable investor's predecessor-the "reasonable person" of tort law. The
reasonable investor standard shares the same basic justification as the reasonable person
standard: whether information is important or misleading requires an objective but at the
same time highly contextualized analysis, making it difficult to craft ex ante rules on point
that are not grossly over- or under-inclusive. Since the earliest uses of the reasonable person
standard, defendants have complained about the uncertainty that surrounds its application,
just as critics of the reasonable investor standard do today. But the reasonable person
standard has nevertheless persevered through centuries of common law development,
suggesting that its benefits outweigh its costs. This raises the question whether the
reasonable investor standard differs from tort law's reasonable person standard in ways

156. See, e.g., Colin Diver, The Optimal PrecisionofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73-74 (1983);
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 153, at 177.
157. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 154, at 267; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 609 (1992).
158. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 153, at 62, 66.
159. Factors stressed in the literature include the heterogeneity of the conduct to be regulated-the more
heterogeneous the conduct, the higher the cost of generating rules (Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 154, at 267) and
the greater the problem of under- and over-inclusion (id. at 268). It has also been observed that rule generation
will be more costly the more politically controversial the issue (id.), whereas the benefits of incurring the fixed
costs of detailing a rule are greater for rules that govern a larger amount of conduct (id. at 274; Kaplow, supra
note 157, at 577; Diver, supranote 156, at 75). Scholars have further noted that the under- and over-inclusiveness
of rules is of special concern if errors of misspecification are particularly costly given the regulated area, just as
the uncertainty of standards is of special concern if errors of misapplication are particularly costly. Id. at 74. The
likelihood of economic or technological change in a regulated area is another relevant factor, as rules suffer from
obsolescence more than standards and thus can require costly updating. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 154, at 27778; Kaplow, supra note 157, at 616.
160. The concepts of materiality and misleadingness under the federal securities laws apply to a large amount
of conduct, thus pointing toward the desirability of rules. Also favoring rules is the significance of errors of
misapplication: given the large sanctions threatened in securities class actions, corporate issuers may respond to
the threat of legal error by taking steps that diminish the usefulness of corporate disclosures, thus undermining
the very purpose of federal securities regulation. But errors of misspecification will also undermine the federal
securities laws' disclosure goals, and are very likely to occur given that the conduct to be regulated is quite
heterogeneous. Moreover, disclosure rules can be politically divisive, and may suffer from obsolesce given rapid
change in the capital markets. These latter factors favor a standards-based approach. See generally supra note
159.
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that suggest it is less efficient.
Looking to the common law of tort for guidance in evaluating the liability provisions
of the federal securities laws has a long tradition. 161 Surprisingly, the reasonable investor
test has never been subjected to such analysis. This Part fills that gap by comparing tort
law's reasonable person standard with the reasonable investor standard of the federal
securities laws, identifying important differences. The exercise proves quite useful. To
preview, the differences identified suggest that the reasonable investor standard is likely
more costly than tort law's reasonable person standard. But, as discussed in the next Part,
they also suggest a different approach to reform than the move toward bright-line rules
long advocated by critics of the reasonable investor standard.
Just like the determination of the appropriate amount of care to be taken under the law
of negligence, the determination of the meaning and import of corporate disclosures under
the federal securities laws is appropriately done on an objective basis. A standard that
varied based on the views of the defendant would be difficult to administer due to proof
problems, and would fail to achieve the uniformity of disclosure practice across issuers that
is one of the primary justifications for the federal system of mandatory disclosure.162 But,
unlike with the reasonable person standard of a simple tort case, there is no reason to
believe that the desired goal of objectivity can be achieved if the standard is left to juries
to apply intuitively.
Recall that the use of juries has been cited as mitigating the uncertainty of tort law's
reasonable person standard since its inception.1 63 The jury has always been viewed as not
only competent to give meaning to the concept of reasonableness in a simple tort case, but
as uniquely competent. Drawing on each members' personal experiences, the jury's
decision in a simple tort case is relied upon to reflect "the conscience of the community"
as to what level of care we expect of one another in daily life. The jury is counted on to
channel this community conscience not just in how it takes account of the varied facts and
circumstances of the particular case, but also by giving normative content to the very
concept of reasonableness. Whether the "reasonable person" is a utilitarian or a Kantian,
for example, or some context-dependent combination of the two, is left for the jury to
decide implicitly. If a single judge were assigned these tasks instead, the decisions reached
would be far less legitimate.
As explained in Part II, when we move from simple tort cases to cases involving
specialized activities, relying on the intuitions of a lay jury to judge what is reasonable
loses its appeal, and it follows that jury resolution of the issue becomes less important from
a functional perspective. In such cases, juror determinations of reasonableness will be
arbitrary and inconsistent unless informed by expert evidence. Juries have no special
competence in evaluating expert evidence; indeed, some would argue that judges are better
equipped than juries to serve as fact-finders on issues requiring expert testimony, because
judges are better trained to comprehend what can be the highly complex material
involved.i6 When we move away from simple tort cases to cases involving specialized

.

161. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 700 ("If every firm must disclose the same things,
there will be reciprocal benefits to each firm's investors. .
163. See supra text accompanying note 47.
164. See Smith, supra note 49.
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activities, relying on the jury to define the standard of care also ceases to make sense. Not
only would the jury be an unqualified and illegitimate body to make this policy choice, but
experts need an answer at the outset of the litigation so that they know what it is they are
called to opine on.
Tort law's approach to cases alleging negligence in the provision of professional
services is instructive. In such cases, the identity of the reasonable person is not left
undefined, the way it is in a simple negligence case. Instead, the jury is instructed to judge
the defendant's behavior against the behavior of a reasonable professional in the same field
as the defendant.
And, in assessing how this reasonable professional would have
behaved under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, jurors are not called upon
to render a social judgment based upon their personal experiences, the way they would in
a simple negligence case;166
rather, they must base their determination "only on the testimony
of the expert witnesses."
Like the provision of professional services, securities investing is a specialized
activity that most jurors will have had little to no personal experience with. Whereas almost
every adult has had extensive experience driving a car, a majority of Americans have never
invested in securities.167 Ownership rates are particularly low among certain
demographics. For example, a recent poll shows that only 15% of those earning less than
$30,000 a year and only 25% of those without a college degree have money invested in
stocks.168 Among the minority of Americans that do own securities, most do so only
indirectly, through a mutual or pension fund, and thus have likely never read disclosure
documents prepared by non-investment companies. 169 Even among the small subset of the
population that purchases stock directly, most are unlikely to actually read public company
disclosures. 170 The average American's lack of knowledge about securities investing is
reflected in the dismal performance of most Americans on even basic financial literacy

165. See supra note 48.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Alec Tyson, Economic Recovery Favors the More Affluent Who Own Stocks, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 31, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/31/stocks-and-the-recovery-majority-ofamericans-not-invested-in-the-market/ ("A Pew Research survey in March found that 53% of Americans say they
have no money at all invested in the stock market, including retirement accounts"). Even fewer Americans own
bonds than stocks. See John Sabelhaus et al., Equity and Bond Ownershipin America, 2008, INV. COMPANY INST.
& SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FIN. MKTS. ASS'N 8 (2008), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt 08-equity-owners.pdf.

168.

Tyson, supranote 167; see also Sabelhaus et al., supra note 167, at 16 fig.2.1. Civil juries, notably, are

dominated by non-college graduates. See JOE CECIL ET AL., JURY SERV. IN LENGTHY CIV. TRiALS 19 tbl.4,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (1987).

169. For some time, the demand for directly held equities and bonds has been falling, while demand for
mutual funds has been rising. See INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 11-12 (5th ed. 2015). See
also Sabelhaus et al., supra note 167, at 24 fig.2.9. Even investment company disclosures often go unread, or are
not read carefully. See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 934, 978-1008 (surveying research on the behavior of mutual fund investors).
170. Instead, most direct investors likely rely on the advice of an investment professional, or on the integrity
of the market price. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Tr, Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) ("[lI]t
is reasonable to presume that most investors-knowing that they have little hope of outperforming the market in
the long run based solely on their analysis of publicly available information-will rely on the security's market
price as an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all public information.").
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questionnaires.171
It follows from this reality that the reasonable investor standard cannot be justified as
providing a conduit for the jury to express its collective wisdom as to what is reasonable
to expect in SEC filings or other corporate disclosures, akin to the way the reasonable
person standard functions in a simple tort case. Mostjurors will have no such wisdom, even
if we conceive of the "reasonable investor" as an average retail investor. Thus, in securities
cases-like in professional negligence cases in tort-some form of expert evidence will
typically be necessary for fact-finders to reach informed and consistent judgments. This is
hardly a radical proposition: in the small subset of federal securities cases that actually
proceed to the merits (mostly SEC enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions), expert
172
evidence is routinely offered to establish or disprove materiality.
Two conclusions flow from these observations. First, juror resolution of the
reasonable investor standard is less important than juror resolution of the reasonable person
standard in a simple tort case, given that such decisions should not be based on the jury's
social judgment but rather on some form of expert evidence. Second, and relatedly, the
need to specify the reasonable investor's identity is more pressing than in a simple tort
case. Should event studies be required to show materiality, as is apparently the rule in the
Third Circuit? 1 73 If survey evidence should be used to establish how a "reasonable
174
investor" would have viewed challenged statements, as some scholars have advocated,
to whom should the surveys be directed? Is the viewpoint of market professionals probative
and, if so, will testimony by any investment professional suffice or must they have
experience in the defendant company's industry? The answers to these questions depend
entirely on how one conceives of the reasonable investor.
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part III.A, the reasonable investor's identity is not
specified in statute or SEC rule. Nor is it defined in jury instructions. 175 Instead, all that
we know of the reasonable investor's identity is found in murky, inconsistent, and arguably
incoherent case law. This state of affairs stands in stark contrast to tort cases involving
allegations of professional negligence, where the perspective that experts and fact-finders
must take in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is clear. The
reasonable investor standard is in this way left much more uncertain than tort law's

171. See Pa Bryn Mawr, Crash CourseNeeded: FourOut of Five Americans Fail When Quizzed on How to
Make Their Nest Eggs Last (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.theamericancollege.edu/ricp-retirement-incomesurvey/press-release.php.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152,171 n.26 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that, in addition to using
event studies to prove materiality, the government could use Wall Street analysts to "testify that a pharmaceutical
company's sales and the level of wholesaler inventory are material to their investment decisions and forecasts");
United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (utilizing investment and accounting expert testimony
on materiality); SEC v. Goldstone, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61657, *145-151 (D.N.M. May 10, 2016) (using event
studies as evidence of materiality).
173. See SEC v. Berlacher, 2010 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 95759, at *19-20 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010) (interpreting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997) in this way); accordIn re Merck & Co.
Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
174. E.g., Huang, supra note 89, at 114; Hoffman, "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder,supranote 75, at
607; Padfield, Is Puffery Material, supra note 74, at 341.
175. See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT § 18.2 (JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2007) (giving instruction on materiality in Rule lOb-5 cases).
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reasonable person standard.
To be sure, common law misrepresentation claims sometimes involved the sale of
securities, and in those cases materiality was similarly left to juries to judge by reference
to the import an undefined reasonable person would have attached to the challenged
information.176 But, as the Supreme Court has observed, "the typical fact situation in which
the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was light years away from the
world of commercial transactions" at issue in modem securities class actions.
Common
law misrepresentation cases involved face-to-face dealings between the plaintiff and
defendant, 78 and they required the plaintiff to show that the defendant made the challenged
misrepresentation with the specific intention of inducing the sale, and that the plaintiff
actually and justifiably relied upon the defendant's misrepresentation.1 79 Thus, the jury
was asked to judge whether, in a specific face-to-face transaction with a developed factual
context, a reasonable person standing in the plaintiffs shoes would have viewed the
misrepresentation as important. The major liability provisions in the federal securities laws,
by contrast, have been interpreted to allow shareholders who did not transact directly with
the defendants to sue and to obtain recovery without proving actual reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations. 180 As a result, juries in such cases must decide how a disembodied and
undefined "reasonable investor" would judge the import of corporate information released
generally into the marketplace-a much different task.
This takes us to the other important distinction between the reasonable investor
standard and the reasonable person standard of the common law. The uncertainty generated
by the reasonable investor standard is not only greater than the uncertainty generated by
the reasonable person standard, it is also more problematic. This is because the stakes in
securities class actions are dramatically higher than the stakes in traditional tort cases. In
traditional tort cases, class certification was not an option-at first because the modern
class device simply did not exist, and later because issues like reliance had to be proven on
an individualized basis.
Because the liability provisions of the federal securities laws
can be enforced without a showing of traditional reliance, not only can more investors sue
(including secondary market traders who did not read the challenged disclosures), but their
claims are typically suitable for class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3).182 As a result, securities class actions threaten public companies with a massive
liability unheard of in common law misrepresentation cases,

such that even a small

176. Alternatively, the plaintiff could prove materiality by showing that the defendant knew or had reason
to know that the plaintiff would regard the information as important. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 538
(1977).
177. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975).
178. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1988) ("the modem securities markets, literally
involving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early
fraud cases").
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
180. Amanda M. Rose, Form vs. Function in Rule 1Ob-5 Class Actions, 10 DuKE . CONST. LAW & PUB.
POL'Y 57, 59-60 (2015).
181. See THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES §§ 1.02 & 6.04[5](a) (Law
Journal Press; Lslf edition 2017).
182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The PoliticalEconomy
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amount of uncertainty might distort issuer disclosure choices ex ante, and pressure
defendants to settle ex post. 184 This potentially feeds an unvirtuous cycle by stunting the
development of clarifying precedent and encouraging the filing of borderline cases. 18 5
Reasonable minds might differ on how severe of a problem this is, and whether it
requires a response, but one thing is clear: many lower courts view it as a problem, and are
taking it upon themselves to address it.
Although the Supreme Court has instructed that
the reasonable investor standard cannot be decided as a matter of law absent unusual
circumstances, courts increasingly do so anyway under the guise of the "safety valve"
doctrines discussed in Part III.C. Indeed, a substantial number of securities cases are
disposed of pre-trial pursuant to these doctrines, despite frequent court statements to the
effect that this is almost never appropriate.1 87
This is hardly a phenomenon unique to securities cases. Lower courts have a knack of
finding ways to release settlement pressure in high-stakes litigation, even when those
techniques seemingly conflict with Supreme Court precedent or other positive law. For
example, it is sometimes asserted thatjudges presiding over mass tort cases inappropriately
resolve a "battle of the experts" under the guise of Daubert-gatekeeping, in order to dismiss
cases on summary judgment.188 In addition, some claim that before the Supreme Court
actually heightened the standard for stating a claim in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
189
lower courts applied rigorous pleading standards in class actions.
Twombly highlights that the Supremel Court, too, is sometimes responsive to concerns
about settlement pressure in aggregate litigation.1 90 This clearly was not the case in

of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 217, 224 ("Given the trading volume in
secondary markets, the potential recoverable damages in securities class actions can be a substantial percentage
of the corporation's total capitalization, easily reaching hundreds of millions of dollars, and sometimes billions.").
184. Uncertainty over the application of the reasonable investor test is, of course, only one of several factors
that push securities class actions to settle. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 144 (discussing the complex
incentives of insurance companies, individually named defendants, litigants and counsel in the settlement
dynamic); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN. L. REV. 497, 505 (1991) ("a combination of factors including the parties' economic incentives, transaction
and agency costs, procedural and substantive rules of law, and the existence of insurance combine to make trial
an unthinkable alternative").
185. See Bone & Evans, supra note 144, at 1292 ("because plaintiffs file frivolous and weak cases to obtain
a settlement, the greater prospect of settlement with successful certification should encourage plaintiffs to file
more frivolous and weak cases").
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 127.
188. See, e.g., Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the DisappearingJury Trial, 69 U. PITr. L.
REV. 281 (2007).
189. See Jason A. Cantone et al., Whither Notice Pleading?:PleadingPracticein the DaysBefore Twombly,
39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 23 (2014); see also Brian Fitzpatrick, Twombly & lqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1621, 1629 (2012) (noting the view that "all the Supreme Court did in Twombly and Iqbal was catch up to what
lower courts had been doing for some time").
190. See also Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation:A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163,
164 (2000) (characterizing the Supreme Court's trilogy of summary judgment cases-Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)-as designed in part to deal with the strike suit problem).

The "ReasonableInvestor" of FederalSecurities Law

2017]

109

Amgen,191 but has been a feature in many other Supreme Court securities decisions 92
including most recently in Omnicare.193 The Court in Omnicareextended the reach of the
reasonable investor test, but not without addressing the defendant's concern that the
decision would invite strike suits. The Court did so by emphasizing that pleading
misleadingness under the test adopted would be "no small task" for plaintiffs. 194 Language
in the decision actually goes so far as to suggest that the district court, in ruling on a motion
to dismiss, should itself decide the materiality of the omitted facts alleged to have rendered
an opinion misleading and, if it finds that they are material, decide whether a reasonable
investor would have viewed the opinion as misleading in light of their omission.195 While
the Court cannot have meant this-instructing district courts to do anything more than
determine whether reasonable minds could differ on these issues would upend a
considerable body of well-established jurisprudence-the sloppy drafting reveals
something about the Court's collective mindset.
While the concerns that animate the materiality safety-valve doctrines are easy to
understand, aggressive use of these doctrines is problematic. As explained in Section III.C,
the practice contradicts the weight of Supreme Court precedent and thereby undermines
the rule of law. Moreover, even if we interpret Omnicareas marking a shift in the Supreme
Court's stance, applying the reasonable investor standard based only on the pleadings is
bad public policy. Judges, though more likely to own securities than the average juror, are
similarly unlikely to apply the reasonable investor standard in a coherent and consistent
way absent (a) a clear articulation of the reasonable investor's identity and (b) the aid of
expert testimony. 196

191. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1199-1202, 1206 (2013).
192. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163-64 (2008); Cent.
Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
193. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1318 (2015).
194. Id. at 1332.
195. Omnicare instructs that "on remand .. . the court must determine whether the omitted fact would have
been material to a reasonable investor-i.e., whether 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor]
would consider it important."' Id. at 1333 (emphasis added). If materiality is found, "the court must ask whether
the alleged omission rendered Omnicare's legal compliance opinions misleading .. . because the excluded fact
shows that Omnicare lacked the basis for making those statements that a reasonable investor would expect." Id.
(emphasis added). The Court elaborated:
Insofar as the omitted fact at issue is the attorney's warning, that inquiry entails consideration of such
matters as the attorney's status and expertise and other legal information available to Omnicare at
the time. Further, the analysis of whether Omnicare's opinion is misleading must address the
statement's context. That means the court must take account of whatever facts Omnicare did provide
about legal compliance, as well as any other hedges, disclaimers, or qualifications it included in its
registration statement. The court should consider, for example, the information Omnicare offered
that States had initiated enforcement actions against drug manufacturers for giving rebates to
pharmacies, that the Federal Government had expressed concerns about the practice, and that the
relevant laws could be interpreted in the future in a manner that would harm Omnicare's business,
Id. (emphases added).
196.

See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

The foregoing analysis suggests that the reasonable investor standard likely generates
more uncertainty than the prototypical use of the reasonable person standard in the law of
tort. Unlike in a simple tort case, juries cannot be relied upon to imbue the standard with
an accepted social meaning. Rather, like in professional negligence cases, expert testimony
must guide the fact-finder if principled decisions are to be rendered. But whereas the
standard of care in professional negligence cases is defined by industry standards,
sharpening the focus of expert testimony and providing better guidance to regulated parties,
the identity of the reasonable investor remains opaque. The greater level of uncertainty that
surrounds the reasonable investor standard is matched by the higher stakes that exist in
securities class actions. Given this potent combination, it is not surprising that securities
class actions that are not disposed of pretrial almost inevitably settle, and that judges in
turn have taken it upon themselves to apply the reasonable investor test on the pleadingsnotwithstanding their lack of authority or qualification.
It does not follow from the foregoing, however, that the switch to bright-line rules
long advocated by critics of the reasonable investor standard is warranted. Such a move,
while reducing over-deterrence costs, would likewise increase the risk of fraud by
providing a path for companies to evade liability for intentionally misleading
disclosures. 197 The net effects of this tradeoff would be impossible to measure or
predict. 19 8 Nor would such reforms prove politically feasible. As detailed in Section III.C,
the SEC and Supreme Court have repeatedly rejected proposed bright-line alternatives to
the reasonable investor test, and their stance is unlikely to change in the future. Nor is
Congress likely to conjure the political will to adopt a rule that could be characterized as
offering firms a roadmap to commit fraud with impunity, even if motivated by legitimate
concerns about over-deterrence.
Luckily, a switch to bright-line rules is not the only way to address the concerns raised
by the reasonable investor test. As detailed below, more certain social welfare gains could
likely be achieved through a different package of reforms that flow naturally from the
analysis in Part IV.
A. Identfy the ReasonableInvestor
First, policymakers should resolve the unanswered questions regarding the identity of
the reasonable investor. Whereas the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the reasonable
person in a simple tort case serves a function, there is no justification for the ambiguity
surrounding the identity of the reasonable investor. The latter should not be defined through
the collective wisdom of a lay jury that has no knowledge about securities investing and
no intuition about the normative goals of federal securities regulation. Nor should it be
decided on an ad hoc basis by inexpert and unelected judges. Instead, it should be the
197. See supra note 110. Consider a materiality test that rendered any matter impacting revenue by less than
5% immaterial as a matter of law. Such a rule might save companies time and expense in the preparation of their
disclosure documents. It might also reduce the level of noise in those documents, making them more useful to
investors. But such a rule might also embolden companies to habitually overstate revenues by 4,99%, which
would undermine the usefulness of corporate disclosures to investors.
198. See Couture, supra note 112, at 458-64 (discussing the trade-offs associated with altering the threshold
for materiality).
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studied focus of SEC rule-making or congressional legislation.
Better specifying the reasonable investor's identity would work to reduce overdeterrence costs by making it easier for issuers to make and defend their disclosure choices.
But, unlike the bright-line rules that have been repeatedly rejected by the SEC and Supreme
Court, it would do so without undermining the flexibility of the reasonable investor
standard and thereby creating a roadmap for fraud: fact-finders would still be required to
consider all the facts and circumstances particular to the case at hand in judging materiality
and misleadingness, they would just do so through a more carefully articulated lens. That
lens would also serve to focus the presentation of expert evidence.
Identifying the reasonable investor is likely to be a politically uncomfortable task, as
it will require that policymakers confront some difficult and long-avoided questions about
the intended audience for the mandatory disclosures required by the federal securities laws.
As Professor Langevoort has explained, "a fair amount of what the [SEC] does ... is in the
name of making disclosure 'accessible' to the average investor." 1 9 "That sentiment," he
explains, "has led to the creation of an awkward myth-story" which envisions retail
investors as "earnest and rational" consumers of corporate disclosures, engaged in the hard
work of fundamental analysis.200 As explained in Part III.A, this image can be attacked as
both descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable.201 Not only that, but it cannot
be reconciled with other aspects of federal securities regulation which build upon the
insights of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (including the FOTM presumption of
reliance that is key to class certification in many Rule lOb-5 cases). The efficient capital
markets hypothesis implies that nonprofessionals should not read corporate disclosures
because they cannot beat the market, and instead should act as passive price takers, building
a well-diversified portfolio of securities to minimize risk.202
While confronting these existing tensions will be uncomfortable, there is reason to
hope for progress. The SEC is currently overseeing a broad initiative to review disclosure
rules for U.S. public companies.203 While the main goal of the initiative is to remove
outdated or redundant disclosure requirements, the staff has recognized that the "audience
for disclosure" is an important consideration in deciding what information should be
required, and in which filings. 204 It has therefore requested public comment on the question
whether "registrants [should] assume some level of investor sophistication in preparing
their disclosures" and, if so, what level of sophistication.205 The SEC staff has also asked
the public "[t]o what extent should the reliance of certain investors on market prices or
199. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 173.
200. Id.
201. See supranotes 81-93 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 85-86. Like the FOTM presumption of reliance, the SEC's 2005 liberalization of the
gun-jumping rules reflects a belief in the ECMH. See Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,44,726,
44,727 (Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249, 274).
203. See, e.g., Business and FinancialDisclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC Concept Release No.
33-10064, at 6 (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf (concept release seeking
public comment "to assess whether [the business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K]
continue to provide the information that investors need to make informed investment and voting decisions and
whether any of our rules have become outdated or unnecessary").
204. Id. at 14, 45-52.
205. Id.at51.
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third-party analyses, rather than using disclosure directly, be a factor in determining the
type of investor to which disclosures should be targeted?" 206 Although the SEC staff has
not drawn the connection explicitly, the relationship between these questions and the
reasonable investor test is obvious.207
Focusing on the target audience for challenged disclosures as a way to give flesh to
the reasonable investor makes eminent sense. It also points out that the reasonable investor
should not be given a monolithic identity, as target audiences will differ depending on the
type of issuer. Many have argued, for example, that public company disclosures should be
judged by reference to their effect on the market, as revealed through event studies when
such studies are probative and by reference to the opinion of market professionals when
they are not.208 Such an approach is justified, the argument goes, because nonprofessionals rarely read let alone rely on public company disclosures, nor should they.209
This argument has considerable force in the context of public operating companies, but it
does not extend to public investment companies.210 Non-professional investors do, or at
least should, read their mutual fund's disclosures, for example, ust as they should listen to
and rely upon the statements of their investment advisors.21 Thus, the identity of the
reasonable investor should likely be conceived of differently in cases challenging such

206. Id. at 52.
207. As part of its current disclosure review initiative, the SEC staff has also sought commentary on whether
to limit reliance on prescriptive disclosure requirements and to emphasize instead a principles-based approach.
See id. at 44. Principles-based disclosure requirements leave it to companies to judge whether information is
material and hence must be disclosed (e.g., "disclose any trends likely to have a material effect on operations"),
whereas prescriptive disclosure requirements rely on bright-line tests rather than management's judgment to
determine when disclosure is required (e.g., "disclose all repurchases of equity"). See id. at 34-36. FASB is
contemplating a similar move in the context of financial disclosures. See ProposedASU, supra note 65 at 14.
These changes would result in an even heavier reliance on the concept of materiality, and hence the reasonable
investor, than exists currently.
208. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Event studies are probative only when the defendant
company's stock trades in an efficient market, and suffer from other limitations that may make them unsuitable
in particular cases. See, e.g., Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 81, at 177-78 (discussing some
of the limitations of event studies, including complications that arise if suspicions about the truth are leaked out
to the market over time, if other material events simultaneously affected the stock price, or if market prices underor over-react to information, so that the adjustment time lengthens).
209. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
210. The SEC can make specific disclosure items material by simply by making them mandatory. See
Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform-The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directionsat Once, 71 Bus. LAW. 78 1,
786 (2016) ("The line-item disclosures of Regulation S-K are mandated and do not depend on an independent
judgment by registrants as to their materiality."); Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723, 727 (1989) ("The particular items of information
mandated to be disclosed . .. are presumably automatically deemed to be 'material.'"); Lee, supra note 64, at 670
("Some courts have indicated that information required by. . [SEC Regulations] may be material per se."). Thus,
even if the reasonable investor were defined by reference to a profit-oriented market, any mandated disclosures
on nonpecuniary social issues would remain actionable by the SEC. See Karmel, supra note 210, at 790-816
(discussing examples of such disclosures).
211. See Langevoort, Retail Investors, supra note 83, at 1030 (noting that in the modem day, "retail
investment decisions relate to investing in a mutual fund or insurance product, making retirement plan elections,
or deferring to account management by a brokerage firm or investment adviser, rather than investing directly in
issuers' securities").
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disclosures, as something closer perhaps to an average retail investor.212
My objective here, however, is not to argue for particular definitions of the reasonable
investor-that is a broad topic worthy of a separate paper, and about which much has
already been written.213 Rather, it is simply to highlight the need for policymakers to
develop some explicit definitions, preferably ones that fit with the regulatory goals of the
federal securities laws and with market realities. This is a necessary first step to bring
coherence to the reasonable investor standard.
B. Create an Early, But Evidence-Based, Decision Point
Even if the identity of the reasonable investor were better specified, however,
application of the standard in particular cases would remain highly contextual. The
reasonable investor test might therefore continue to generate a significant degree of
uncertainty over the likely outcome ofthe issue at trial, creating intense settlement pressure
in light of the high stakes involved in securities class actions. Lower courts might therefore
continue to resort to the safety-valve doctrines discussed in Part III.C to decide the
reasonable investor standard on the pleadings. As previously explained, these doctrines are
undesirable because they disrespect the value of precedent. Moreover, even with a clearer
image of the reasonable investor in mind, district court judges are unlikely to reach
principled decisions applying the standard without the benefit of expert evidence. Defining
the reasonable investor then, while a necessary first step, may not go far enough to improve
the status quo.
One obvious response to this state of affairs would be to try to limit the lower courts'
use of the safety-valve doctrines. But, assuming such a reform could be effectively
implemented2, 214 we would be left with the problem that has motivated resort to these
doctrines in the first place: class action allegations implicating the reasonable investor
standard would rarely be put to test, as pretrial resolution would be impossible except in
the most implausible of cases and the uncertainty surrounding jury resolution would result

212. Disclosures by private companies (including private investment companies) have yet another intended
audience. Such offerings are often limited by law to "sophisticated" or "accredited investors" (see C. Steven
Bradford, TransactionExemptions in the SecuritiesAct of 1933: An EconomicAnalysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 62224 (1996)), and the conception of the reasonable investor that applies in such cases ought to take this into account.
Private company disclosures are different for another, more fundamental reason. In cases challenging such
disclosures, plaintiffs generally must prove actual reliance, so class certification is not an option, and there is
often a record of face-to-face dealings. These cases therefore tend to look much more like common law
misrepresentation cases than modem securities class actions do, and a different approach to issues of materiality
and misleadingness may therefore be warranted. For example, it may make sense to embrace the common law's
dual approach to materiality in such cases. That approach deems a matter material if a reasonable person would
attach importance to it or if the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff
would regard the information as important. See supra note 33. This approach would ease the burden of proving
materiality in cases brought against perpetrators of Ponzi schemes and affinity frauds, whose outlandish
statements a reasonable investor, objectively defined, might disregard. See Sachs, supranote 76.
213. For some contributions to this body of literature, see supra note 82; Huang, supra note 89; Sachs, supra
note 76; Black, supra note 75. See also Couture, supra note 112, at 509-10 (summarizing arguments by various
scholars).
214. This might prove tricky to police, as district courts must retain some discretion to dismiss complaints
containing allegations so obviously unimportant to an investor that reasonable minds could not differ.
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in almost certain settlement. This would stunt the development of clarifying precedent and
invite the filing of borderline cases. The over-deterrence costs that would be generated as
a result, while difficult to quantify, are easy to imagine. If the choice is to either disclose a
seemingly trivial piece of information or face a protracted securities class action for
omitting what might in hindsight be considered a "material" fact, companies may err on
the side of disclosure, bogging down what are already, many believe, overly-burdened
filings. Conversely, if the choice is between saying nothing or facing a protracted securities
class action for disclosing what in hindsight might be construed as a materially misleading
half-truth, companies may err on the side of silence, depriving investors of potentially
useful information. And on the margin, the threat of nuisance litigation might cause
companies to forgo going public at all, or to avoid the U.S. capital markets.
Luckily, the choices available to policymakers are not so dichotomous. The
reasonable investor test need not be decided on the pleadings or not at all. The analysis in
Part IV suggests a middle way: Congress could create a decision point for application of
the standard short of a trial on the merits, but one that permits the court to consider and
weigh evidence. Like the safety-valve doctrines, such an approach would mitigate concerns
about strike suits and the over-deterrence costs they generate by ensuring that issues of
materiality and misleadingness are actually litigated, at least some of the time. 2 15 But the
decisions on these issues would be informed by evidence, and would not flout the rule of
law.
The most logical pretrial decision point for an evidence-based resolution of the
reasonable investor test would be class certification. Congress could enact a statute, for
example, expanding the list of certification criteria in cases brought under the federal
securities laws to include, in addition to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, proof of a materially misleading statement, half-truth or omission. Such a
statute would effectively supersede the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in
Amgen,216 but it would also go further. It would apply to all putative federal securities class
actions, not just Rule 1Ob-5 cases seeking certification pursuant to the FOTM presumption
of reliance. And it would cover both the element of materiality and the issue of
misleadingness.217 Tying application of the reasonable investor test to the decision on class
certification is apt because it is the aggregation of claims via the class device that ratchets
up the effects of the test's uncertainty, fueling strike suit concerns. Moreover, judges are
accustomed to weighing evidence and finding facts to ensure that the prerequisites to class
certification have been met. 2 18
There are several predictable objections that may be raised to this proposal. Some will

215. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 144, at 823-24 (arguing that more fact-based adjudication of securities
claims would provide better guidance to future parties engaged in settlement negotiations, tying settlement closer
to the merits).
216. The proposed statute would not, however, disturb Amgen's interpretation of Rule 23's predominance
requirement.
217. As previously explained, both elements require application of the reasonable investor standard. See
supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
218. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-52 (2011). By contrast, "on a motion for
summary judgment, the district court may not weigh evidence or find facts." Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353
F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).
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argue against it because it reassigns to the judge (at least preliminarily) what has
historically been considered a jury issue.219 But this raises no serious constitutional or
policy concerns. The Seventh Amendment is not offended by iudicial fact-finding on the
prerequisites to class certification, even when the issues decided relate to the merits.220
This is because all that is at stake at class certification is the ability of the plaintiffs to
access a procedural device 221: if certification is granted, it will remain open to the iury to
decide the issue differently, 222 and if certification is denied, investors will retain their right
to try the issue before a jury in an individual suit. 223
From a policy standpoint, jury resolution of the reasonable investor standard has never
been of much value. For one thing, jur resolution rarely ever occurs given the intense
224
pressure that exists to settle before trial.
Second and more fundamentally, the jury in a
securities class action is not called upon to serve the important function that the jury serves
in a simple tort case. Recall that in a simple tort case the jury is meant to channel the
conscience of the community in rendering its decision and thereby to legitimize the
otherwise content-less reasonable person standard; in a securities class action, by contrast,
application of the reasonable investor standard should usually be judged by reference to
expert testimony.225 Juries are not obviously better equipped to evaluate expert testimony
than judges; to the contrary, many believe judges have the advantage by virtue of their
advanced education and experience. 226
219. Securities law claims are entitled to a jury trial when legal remedies are sought. See James N. Benedict
et al., The Trial ofa Securities Case: Selected Issues and Strategies, in ALI-ABA Course of Study: SECURITIES
LITIGATION PLANNING AND STRATEGIES SB93 (May 1997) (surveying cases on point).

220. This is the best reading of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. See Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial
Gatekeeping ofAggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 324, 36466 (2011); cf Michael J. Kauftman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class
Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 357 (2010); Steig D.
Olson, "Chipping Away": The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class
Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 935, 938 (2009). Of course, not all approve of the course that Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence has taken. See generally Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class
Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 969 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, Why the
Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment Is Unconstitutional,93 VA. L. REv. 139 (2007).
221. Cf Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) ("[The presumption
against preemption] carries less force here than in other contexts because SLUSA does not actually pre-empt any
state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims.
The Act does not deny any individual plaintiff.. . the right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may
exist.").

222. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351 n.6.
223. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Tr. Funds, 133 S.
Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013). Even when the judge's decision would strip the plaintiff of its right to put the issue before
a jury-which again is not a possibility under the proposed statute-some courts have held that judicial factfinding on matters that overlap with the merits does not offend the Seventh Amendment if necessary to decide
issues of "judicial traffic control." Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
224. See supra note 30.
225. See supra notes 163-172 and accompanying text.
226. See supranote 49. The Supreme Court's seminal patent decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
517 U.S. 370 (1996), is instructive. Patent claims must be construed from the perspective of a "person having
ordinary skill in the art" (PHOSITA). Even though how a PHOSITA would construe a patent cannot typically be
judged without the benefit of expert testimony, Markman held that the task of patent claim construction is for the
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Critics are also likely to point to the costs the proposed statute would generate. This
is a more serious concern. Requiring the reasonable investor test to be adjudicated in a
mini-trial at class certification would require the ongoing expenditure ofjudicial resources.
In addition, it would operate to increase the costs plaintiffs' lawyers must incur to get cases
to a settlement posture, which may discourage filings on the margins. To the extent the
marginal cases discouraged involve allegations of materiality or misleadingness that cannot
be supported by evidence, the reform will simply have achieved its purpose; but it is
possible that some meritorious cases might also be discouraged, undermining the
deterrence potential of private securities litigation. How significant these potential costs
would be, and whether they would outweigh the potential benefits of the proposed statute,
are difficult empirical questions. Reasonable people may have different intuitions as to the
answers. 227 A few considerations, however, give cause for optimism.
First, although applying the reasonable investor standard at class certification would
impose a new burden on the judiciary, it would at the same time save judicial resources if
it succeeds in reducing the number of borderline cases that are filed. The net costs imposed
on the judiciary would depend on these relative impacts.
Second, although the proposed statute might increase the costs imposed on plaintiffs'
lawyers and thereby discourage the filing of some meritorious cases, it might also result in
fewer dismissals of meritorious cases based on the safety-valve doctrines. District courts
might be less inclined to resort to these doctrines, once the option to decide materiality at
class certification is made available. By weeding out non-meritorious cases, the proposed
reform should also increase the reputational consequences of the class actions that do
survive to settlement. Any assessment of the impact of the reform on the deterrence
potential of private securities litigation would need to take all of these effects into account.
Third and most importantly, the statute could be written in a way that dramatically
minimizes its costs. Specifically, instead of requiring plaintiffs to prove a materially
misleading statement, half-truth or omission in every case in order to achieve class
certification, the statute could simply permit defendants to rebut the certifiability of the
class by presenting proof of their absence. Thus, only in a subset of cases where defendants
felt confident in their ability to prevail on these issues would plaintiffs be called upon to
litigate them. This would not only minimize the impact of the reform on the incentive for
court, not the jury. "[T]he construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are
likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis," the Court explained. Id. at 388. Although
"credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify in patent cases, and in theory there could be
a case in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was
equally consistent with a patent's internal logic," the Court explained that this would be a rare situation:
In the main, we expect, any credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term
can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases a
jury's capabilities to evaluate demeanor, to sense the "mainsprings of human conduct," or to reflect
community standards, are much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent.
Id. at 389-90 (internal citations omitted),
227. The deterrence potential of private securities litigation it hotly debated. See generally Amanda M. Rose,
Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC's New WhistleblowerProgram Changes the Securities FraudClass Action
Debate, 108 Nw. U.L. REv. 1235, 1245-60 (2014).
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plaintiffs to bring meritorious cases, it also would reduce the burden on the judiciary,
because mini-trials would be a feature in fewer cases.
Putting the onus on defendants to disprove these issues at class certification would
take a play from the Court's recent decision in Halliburton Co. v. Eric P. John Funds,
Inc.228 In Halliburton,the Court held that while a plaintiff is not required to present proof
of a misrepresentation's impact on a securities' market price in order to achieve class
certification in a case invoking the FOTM presumption of reliance, defendants have a right
to present evidence rebutting price impact in order to defeat class certification.229 Notably,
Halliburtondoes not appear to have significantly depressed securities class action filingsto the contrary, filings this year are on pace to be the highest since the enactment of the
PSLRA.230 It is also telling that defendants do not appear to be presenting evidence to rebut
price impact in every case. This makes sense: doing so and failing would negatively affect
the defendant's posture in subsequent settlement negotiations. 23 1
Another line of attack might challenge the scope of the proposal. Why, one might ask,
stop at the reasonable investor test? Why not instead allow the court to conduct a full merits
review at class certification, considering, for example, issues of scienter, loss causation and
damages in Rule I Ob-5 suits? 232 The problem with such an approach becomes apparent if
one thinks through its incentive effects. If the court considered the full merits of the case
at class certification, and granted the certification motion, the defendant's position in
subsequent settlement negotiations would be incredibly weak. And if the court denied class
certification, the plaintiff would have no leverage to demand any settlement at all.
Essentially, litigating class certification would be akin to taking the case to trial, an
extremely expensive gamble that neither side wants to take. The predictable result would
be that the parties would reach a settlement agreement earlier in the process and then move
228. Halliburton Co. v. Eric P. John Funds, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
229. Id. at 2414. The proposed statute would have the ancillary benefit of alleviating current judicial
confusion over the interaction between Halliburton and Amgen. Some courts have refused to consider defense
evidence proffered at class certification to disprove price impact (an issue that Halliburton teaches may be
litigated at class certification) when it also speaks to materiality (an issue Amgen teaches may not be litigated at
class certification). See, e.g., Food Employees Welfare Fund v. Regions Financial Corp., 2014 WL 6661918, at
8-10 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014); Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharmaceutical Partners, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657,670 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 29, 2014).
230.

See CORNERSTONE REs., supra note 30, at 1.

231. See
Press
Release,
Beazley,
Halliburton
Ramifications
(June
23,
2014),
https://www.beazley.com/news/2014/halliburton-ramifications.htm (observing that "where a defendant tries but
fails to demonstrate the absence of price impact, including where a study rebuts some but not all of the evidence
of artificial price inflation, the potential settlement value of a case could increase significantly"). This highlights
another advantage of the proposed statute relative to the safety-valve doctrines that are used so frequently today.
Unlike the latter, judicial application of the reasonable investor test at class certification would not work to the
exclusive benefit of the defense. When courts reject defense arguments at the motion to dismiss or summary
judgment phase, they simply hold that the issue must be reserved for jury resolution at trial, without necessarily
indicating that the plaintiffs have a strong position. But under this proposal, if the reasonable investor test is
litigated at class certification, and plaintiffs prevail in getting the case certified, the court will have necessarily
found that plaintiffs have met their burden to establish a materially misleading misstatement or omission. Though
not preclusive in a subsequent class trial, this would substantially bolster the plaintiffs' settlement posture.
232. Professors Bone & Evans have argued that a similar approach should be taken to all class actions. See
Bone & Evans, supranote 144 at 1327-29 (arguing that class action law should be reformed to permit certification
only if the court determines the plaintiff has a significant likelihood of success on the merits).
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for certification of a settlement class. It would be quite odd to call on the court to decide
the merits of the case at that point, given that the parties would lack any further adversarial
interest. The better approach would be to hinge class certification on proof-or, better yet,
to hinge denial of certification on disproof--of a materially misleading misstatement, halftruth or omission, and to leave the other elements of the plaintiffs' case on the table for the
parties to debate in subsequent settlement negotiations, should the case move forward.23 3
To be sure, alternative reforms designed to achieve similar ends could be imagined.
For example, comparable concerns have led numerous states to adopt laws sub ecting
medical malpractice claims to screening by an expert panel prior to filing in court. 4 One
could imagine asking the SEC to serve a similar screening function in connection with
securities class actions (indeed, I proposed precisely this in a 2008 article 235). Or Congress
could authorize the use of blue ribbon juries in securities class actions as a way to entice
companies to take more cases to trial, something that has been suggested in the patent
context.236 One advantage of the proposed statute over these alternatives is political
feasibility: because the statute would work a fairly modest change to the current securities
litigation landscape, it stands a better chance of implementation. The proposed statute
would also likely prove more effective-the SEC might shy away from exercising its
screening power in a rigorous way, and companies may not be willing to roll the dice at
trial even if promised a more competent jury. But my goal here is not to prove that the
proposed statute is the only or even the best reform that might be adopted to address
concerns raised by use of the reasonable investor test. Rather, it is simply offered as one
attractive way that policymakers might improve the status quo-a way that, unlike the
bright-line rules that have been advanced in the past, does not offer companies a roadmap
for fraud.
VI. CONCLUSION

For decades the reasonable investor test has been a flashpoint for debate in securities
law circles. That debate has proven incredibly persistent in large part because it has been
framed as a question of rules vs. standards-with critics of the reasonable investor test
complaining of the uncertainty it generates and defenders warning of the underinclusiveness of the bright-line rules offered as alternatives. This Article has attempted to
shed fresh light on the issue by considering how the reasonable investor differs from its
common law antecedent, the reasonable person of tort law. The comparative analysis
undertaken suggests new and promising avenues of reform that are worthy of consideration
by policymakers.

233. It is appropriate to privilege issues for decision at class certification that require application of the
reasonable investor test, given the high level of uncertainty that surrounds the test and the far reaching effects it
has on issuer disclosure choices.
234. See Heather Morton, MedicalLiability/MalpracticeADR and Screening Panels Statutes, NAT'L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 20, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medicalliability-malpractice-adr-and-screening-panels-statutes.aspx.
235. See Rose, Reforming Securities LitigationReform, supra note 8, at 1354.
236. See, e.g., Jordan M. Halle, Avoiding Those Wearing PropellerHats: The Use ofBlue Ribbon Juries in
Complex PatentLitigation, 43 U. BALT. L. REv. 435 (2014).

